


UNIVERSITY OF ST. MICHAEL'S COLLEGE



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WESTMINSTER LECTURES

EDITED BY

Rev. FRANCIS AVELING, D.D.

Series I.

THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

MYSTICISM

TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS

SANDS & CO.



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LONDON: 15 KING STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C.

EDINBURGH: 37 GEORGE STREET

GLASGOW: 76 CAMBRIDGE STREET

The
Resurrection of Christ
Is it a Fact?

BY GIDEON W. B. MARSH

B.A. (Lond.), F.R. Hist. Soc.


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LONDON AND EDINBURGH
SANDS & COMPANY

ST LOUIS, MO.

B. HERDER, 17 SOUTH BROADWAY

1905



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GULIELMUS PRÆPOSITUS JOHNSON,
Vicarius Generalis.

WESTMONASTERII,
die 27 Aprilis, 1905.

P R E F A C E

THIS lecture was delivered by the author, under the auspices of the Catholic Truth Society of Scotland, in Glasgow on the 26th of March 1905, in Edinburgh on the 27th, and in Aberdeen on the 28th. It necessarily deals in an abbreviated form with the constructive proofs of the Resurrection, as also with the destructive criticism of the later and present centuries; but it is hoped that it may be of some small service in the controversy which is raging round the great proof of the divine origin of Christianity. It has been published in the present form in compliance with a widely expressed desire on the part of those who were present at its delivery. The reader will find at the end of the volume a list of some of the authorities—Christian and Rationalist—which the author has consulted in preparing his lecture. It was delivered from

PREFACE

notes, and has had to be written out during the spare time of a busy professional life. The indulgence of the reader is therefore courteously invited if he should find any slight errors due to haste.

40 TACHBROOK STREET, LONDON, S.W.,

April 1905.

THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST.

IS IT A FACT?

WHEN a Christian is asked why he believes in the Blessed Trinity, he will tell you that he does so by divine Faith, not because he can understand or explain it, but because God, who is Infallible Truth, has revealed this doctrine. If you ask him further how he knows that God has revealed it, he will make answer that it is part of the teaching of Jesus Christ, who is God made man. And when you demand his proof that Jesus is God, he will refer you to the Resurrection, as the chief witness for it. Finally, he will tell you that he knows this great miracle to be a fact, in the same way that he knows all other events of history, on human, credible, and reliable evidence. His belief in the Resurrection is therefore not part of a vicious circle of divine Faith, but is rational and scientific, being built

Introduction

**Faith and
Reason**

on the same class of evidence as that on which all history, and all human knowledge, are established. The Resurrection is then, to him, the natural groundwork of his belief in Christianity, and with St Paul he says, "If Christ be not risen from the dead, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain."* But the rising again of Christ is still more to him. It is the foundation of his hope for Heaven, and for reunion with the dear ones "whom we have loved long since, but lost awhile." Christ is "the first fruits of them that slept." His Resurrection is the pledge and earnest to the Christian of his own rising again. Truly did St Paul say, "If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable. But now Christ is risen from the dead, the first fruits of them that sleep."† It is the solidity of this hope that dries the mourner's tears as he stands by the open grave, and enables him to say, "O Death, where is thy sting; O Grave, where is thy victory?" Not only is the Resurrection of Christ the rock on which are built Faith and Hope, it is also the solid foundation of divine Love. "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends."‡ Christ has given the greatest

* 1 Corinthians xv. 14.

† 1 Corinthians xv. 19.

‡ St John xv. 13.

proof of His love for mankind in dying upon the Cross. That this love was more than transitory or human, He has proved by His Resurrection, whereby He has shown Himself to be God—Love itself. Hence is it that the Christian is enabled to give in return the undivided and changeless devotion of his heart, knowing that it is not in vain. Thus, humanly speaking, it may be said that the Resurrection of Christ is the foundation of Faith, Hope, and Charity. If, then, this great miracle can be disproved, the whole value of Christianity as a divinely revealed religion is at once and forever destroyed. It is the knowledge and conviction of this fact that makes Christ's rising again the main object of attack by those who deny the divinity of Jesus. At a time like the present, it is incumbent upon Christians to be able "to give a reason for the faith that is in them," and to be ready to meet the many plausible objections and difficulties which are being urged against the very foundation of their belief. Above all things is it necessary that in dealing with those who differ from him, the follower of Christ should be charitable, courteous, and kind—ever ready to believe the sincerity and honesty of his opponents—ever ready to meet and treat as brothers those who but too often have been driven to say harsh things by the

Importance
of the
Resurrection

Need of
Charity in
Argument

sharp tongues of well-meaning but too impetuous champions of Christianity. Let us then, in the spirit of charity, proceed to inquire into the grounds for our belief in the Resurrection, and into the objections which have been advanced against them. We propose to consider some

**Plan of
Lecture**

of the many proofs which may be adduced to establish the Resurrection of Jesus Christ as an historical fact, and we shall divide our subject into three parts. In the first we shall deal with the purely historical evidence; in the second, with the testimony of St Paul; and in the third, with the witness of the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. In dealing with the New Testament writings, we put aside, for the purposes of our consideration, all question of inspiration, and regard them as merely human, historical documents.

There is hardly any event in the life of Christ which has not been called in question. Nay, His

**Destructive
Criticism**

very existence has been denied by a small number of critics. His miracles have been treated as fables. His death on Calvary has been the object of dispute. This destructive criticism of the latter and present century has found champions in such men as Baur, Strauss, Pfleiderer, Schmiedel, Keim, Weitzsäcker, Renan, Harnack, Huxley, Tyndall, the author of *Supernatural Religion*, Clodd, Robertson, Gould, Laing, and a host of other able writers.

At present we shall confine ourselves to the objections and difficulties which these authorities urge against the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.

The Death of Christ

Before passing on to our immediate subject, we propose briefly to examine a few of the proofs that may be adduced to establish the reality of the death of Christ upon the Cross. It is clear that if Jesus did not die on Calvary He could not have risen again from the dead upon the third day. Now, a Pagan historian could have had no motive, save the recording of a well-known fact, for asserting that Christ died by crucifixion; yet Tacitus tells us in his *Annals*, "Christ, the originator of that name (*Christian*), had been executed by the procurator Pontius Pilate, in the reign of Tiberius."*

If, however, this writer had no inducement of any kind to make him record this fact, save that it was true, the Jews had every reason to hide the nationality, the teaching, and the death of Jesus, for in Him they recognised a Hebrew, who, as they thought, by claiming the Divinity, had brought disgrace upon the great teachers and upholders of Monotheism. Yet a constant Jewish tradition handed

* *Annals* xv. 44.

down to the present day, acknowledges the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth. In the Talmud it is enshrined under the article "Sanhedrin," where we read, "He (*Jesus*) was crucified on the Eve of the Pasch." Thus Pagan and Jewish testimony unite in proving the death of Christ upon Calvary,

in the reign of Tiberius, and under the procurator Pontius Pilate. In the fourth Gospel, which comes down to us from

The flowing
of Blood and
Water

the end of the first century, there is recorded a remarkable occurrence connected with the Crucifixion. We are told that a soldier pierced the side of Jesus, and that forthwith there flowed "blood and water." This incident is conclusive for us of the death of Christ, and it affords us a means of inquiring into its immediate cause. There was no motive urging the writer to make this statement, save truth. If, from it, he makes theological or doctrinal conclusions, or if he sees in it the fulfilment of some prophecy, these circumstances may affect the value of his judgment, but do not touch the fact itself. Moreover, it was a circumstance that struck him as singular, and at that time, physiology, anatomy, and morbid pathology were unknown. He could, therefore, have had no idea of attaching any scientific value to what had happened. Now let us consider the bearing of this piece of evidence upon the great objection that has been brought by Schleiermacher and Paulus against the death of Jesus.

They allege that He was in a swoon, and that in this condition He was removed from the cross into the tomb, where He subsequently revived. Gfrörer adds that the money of Joseph of Arimathea had probably bribed the authorities to connive at this deception practised upon the Jews. If Jesus had been in a fainting condition, and, as some critics allege, the soldier merely grazed His Body with the spear, and did not, as the Gospel alleges, plunge it into His side, what would have happened? In a slight faint, pure blood would have flowed; in a deep one, probably none at all. If the thrust were deep, and Christ were alive, pure blood would have escaped from the wound; if dead from any causes save those about to be mentioned, either no result would have been appreciable to the sight of the bystanders, or at most some oozing of congealed blood. But we are told that "blood and water" flowed. There are three principal conditions under which such a phenomenon could have been observed—pleurisy with effusion, pericarditis, and rupture of the muscular tissue of the heart. The Sufferer was in the prime of manhood, and although for some hours he had been subjected to torture, there is nothing to warrant us in believing that either pleurisy or pericarditis was present. On the other hand,

The Swoon
Theory of
Schleier-
macher,
Paulus, and
Gfrörer

Pathological
value of the
flowing of
Blood and
Water

there was every condition present which might induce rupture of the heart muscle. That tender and sensitive Soul had been wrought upon by emotion the most profound and deep-seated. His love had been rejected, His zeal for His fellow men had been turned against Him. His own chosen ones had deserted Him. In that moment of terrible anguish, there happened, what has been known to occur in such cases, rupture of the heart muscle whereby the blood was poured from the interior of the heart into the pericardial sac that surrounds it. There it divided into blood-clot and serum, and when the sac was opened by the spear, the serum escaped with a rush, looking like water, and then oozed the half-clotted blood, in a treacly mass,—“the blood and water” of St John’s Gospel. Thus, in the simplicity of the narrative given us by an unscientific writer, we have evidence of the fact of death before the spear thrust, and we have also good and solid grounds whereby we may arrive at the most probable cause of death. It, moreover, gives the

Proof of the Death of Christ, from the circumstances attending His Condemnation death blow to the Swoon Theory which it renders untenable. Tacitus, Jewish tradition, and the fourth Gospel, have proved the death of Jesus upon the Cross; but were any doubt left, it is demolished by a consideration of the circumstances under which Christ had been condemned and nailed to the tree. Hated

by the chief priests and by the people, He was hurried from tribunal to tribunal, till the words were spoken that sentenced Him to death. He was crowned with thorns, derided, spat upon, and scourged to blood, amid the derisive jeers of an infuriated mob; and, when tottering beneath the weight of His Cross, they feared He might die upon the way to Calvary, they compelled Simon of Cyrene to bear that burden, lest they should fail to satisfy their cruel passions by gloating over His agony upon the tree of shame. When at last the nails had been driven home, and He hung suspended between heaven and earth—even then this mob of howling miscreants reviled and insulted Him. Were these the men to leave Calvary before they knew for certain that their victim was dead? Were these the men to leave the insensible but animate body in the hands of friends? Their one object was His death, and we may be quite sure they never left the Cross until Jesus was certainly and unmistakably dead.

We may then dismiss all shadow of doubt about the reality of the death of Jesus upon Mount Calvary. No fact of history is or can be more certain.

The Resurrection.—1st, The Historical Proof

And now we shall pass on to consider the historical evidence for the Resurrection. The

first proof that we offer for consideration is the very origin of the Christian Church.

The Resurrection The Apostles and disciples of Christ had forsaken home and friends and occupation to follow Him whom they believed to be the Messiah. In their eyes He was the Expected One who should free Israel from the Roman yoke, and make of the chosen people the rulers of the world. He was to be the

What the Apostles thought of Christ as the Messiah earthly monarch, and they were to sit upon His right hand or His left. No dream of a spiritual kingdom, no thought of a suffering Messiah, had entered their

minds. And so was it that when, upon that last sad week, they followed Him to Jerusalem, they firmly believed that then He would declare Himself, and that then would begin the glories and the triumph of Shiloh. Alas for their hopes! their Master was betrayed, condemned, and crucified. Terrified at the violence of the mob and the hatred of the Sanhedrin, these Apostles

They forsake Jesus forsook their Leader, left Him to His fate, and fled to save themselves. And there He hung upon the Cross, mangled and dead!

All faith and hope were gone in the disciples' breasts. They had thought Him the Messiah, and there He hung dead before their eyes. It was all over. Gentle and tender as He had been during those three years in which they had learned to hang upon His words,

to render love for love, still they had been deceived—cruelly undone. They had hoped that it should have been He that should redeem Israel, but alas! all hope was at an end. He was not, He could not be, the Messiah, for the dead cannot lead a nation to victory. But worst of all, He had died upon the tree of shame, had died the death of a common slave and malefactor; and was it not written, “Cursed be he that hung upon a tree”?* The curse of God had fallen upon Him, and He was not even a friend of God—nay, He was abandoned by Jehovah. Not the Messiah! Not even a friend of God! What a blow to all their faith, to all their hope! There was the meaning of that awful cry, “My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?”

In His Body He bore the curse of His people’s sins. Accursed of God! Long years afterwards St Paul realised it all when he wrote “Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, ‘Cursed is everyone that hangeth on a tree.’”† Such was the state of the apostles’ minds on that first Good Friday. Despair, dejection, and fear held possession of their minds and hearts.

* Deuteronomy xxi. 23.

† Galatians iii. 13.

Yet six short weeks later we find these cowards valiant, these faithless ones proclaiming the Crucified as Lord and Master of Life and Death. Neither fear of Sanhedrin, nor loss of friends, nor social ostracism, nor stripes, nor suffering, nay, not even the fear of death, can hold them back. With one voice they declare that He whom the Jews had crucified was truly the Messiah, despite His death, despite the curse of the tree of shame. What has wrought this wondrous change? They themselves tell us.

The Resurrection the cause of the change He has risen from the dead, and so has reversed the curse and turned it into a blessing. He who had hung upon the Cross had burst the bonds of death, and proved Himself the Master of Death. The Seal of Heaven was upon His life and teaching. Jesus of Nazareth was Jehovah of Sinai, the Incarnate God. God was with them, and who could be against them? This was the frame of their minds at Pentecost. It is impossible, on any other grounds, to account for the change from the gloom of Calvary to the brightness of Easter. There is only one explanation tenable, the Resurrection which they alleged. They were so far from expecting His rising again that they had deserted Him. They were terrified cowards who saw the brand of God's curse upon their Master's brow. Who

should raise the dead? Only a wonder-worker, a prophet, a man of God. And there was no Elijah, no Elisha at hand. And even had there been, such a miracle was not for one whom God had forsaken. And so there was no thought of a resurrection—not even though He had spoken of it to them. Their minds were too much engrossed in the temporal prospects attached to the Messiahship, to understand Him. They did not even comprehend Him when He spoke of His approaching death. And all He had said was forgotten now in this crushing blow. The idea of a self-worked resurrection was unknown alike in Jewry and in Pagandom. Never had it been dreamed that one should or could raise himself. And so no thought of a resurrection for Jesus ever entered their minds. Whence, then, came this assertion at Pentecost of an event they could not even have dreamt in their wildest dreams? Only from the fact itself. Such was the origin of the Christian Church. It sprang from the black night of Calvary into the dazzling sunshine of Easter morning, heralded by the risen Saviour. Let us be clear as to what we mean by this Resurrection. The Church has ever meant and means by it that the mangled, lifeless Body of Jesus that had lain in the grave became whole and living again, glorified and spiritualised indeed, but

still the same human body, endowed with new properties not ordinarily belonging to the natural body, no longer subject to the laws of matter, no longer subject to the law of death. Jesus Christ, Soul and Body, had risen again to die no more. Hence is He "the first fruits of them that slept." Others had risen at the command of a man of God, risen with the same bodies they had at death, but not glorified, not endowed with these new properties, risen indeed but only again to die. Here is the difference between the Resurrection of Jesus and all other resurrections. Herein is He truly "the first fruits of them that slept." But did the Apostles mean this when they alleged His Resurrection and declared that they had seen, handled and conversed with Him? Or did they mean, as Harnack would have us believe, the Easter Faith without the Message? Did they mean that He was risen in power and majesty, and was at the right hand of God? Did they mean that there was no empty tomb; no risen body; no real appearances to the Apostles? Let us see. They proclaimed the Resurrection. Had they meant by that a mere spiritual idea, they would not have been dragged before the Sanhedrin, scourged, and ordered to cease from their preaching. Such persecution would have been without meaning and ridiculous. David had so risen from

What did the
Apostles
mean by the
Resurrec-
tion?

the dead, and was proclaimed as living amongst the people in his Psalms and in his wondrous influence upon the Jewish race. If they had meant such a resurrection they would have cried out before the Council, "You misunderstand us; we mean not a bodily resurrection, but a spiritual one." Yet, so far from that, they continue to assert the physical rising again, and are so understood by the authorities and the people. For this they suffered and were ready to die. They said, "We have seen Him alive, and are witnesses to His Resurrection, and we must tell the truth." At this period of Jewish history there existed two great divisions among the men of authority and learning—the Pharisees and the Sadducees. The former alleged that the bodies of the just should rise again, not, indeed, at that day, but at the end of the world—the latter denied this doctrine. When, then, the Apostles alleged the physical resurrection of Jesus, they were understood to mean what the Pharisees asserted. They differed only in alleging that Jesus had so risen then and there, and the Pharisees and Sadducees understood their statement in this sense. There is an incident in the life of St Paul which bears out what we have said. In the year A.D. 58 the apostle of the Gentiles had been arrested and was brought before

If a merely figurative rising, no need for persecution

Pharisees believed in the ultimate Bodily Resurrection of the Just

Ananias, the ex-high priest, charged with preaching the Resurrection of Jesus. There was a great tumult, and seizing a favourable moment, St Paul cried out in that vast assembly, "Men, Brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees; concerning the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And when he had so said, there arose a disension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees; and the multitude was divided. For the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit; but the Pharisees confess both. And there arose a great cry. And some of the Pharisees, rising up, strove, saying, We find no evil in this man. What if a spirit hath spoken to him, or an angel?"* That St Paul was an honest man, none of the "higher critics" deny. Quite the contrary. Yet, would he have been an honest man if he had availed himself of his knowledge of the Pharisees' belief in a physical resurrection, by appealing for their support, had he not meant that Jesus had truly risen from the grave, with the same body that had been put lifeless into it? They understood him to allege this fact, and though they denied the Resurrection of Jesus, yet when St Paul appealed to the broad principles, they rose and defended him. And what he taught, all the apostles taught.

A.D. 58
St Paul be-
fore Ananias

* Acts xxiii. 6 to 9.

There can then be no doubt that all alike alleged the Resurrection of Jesus in the same sense in which the Christian Church has ever taught it. What, then, is the value of this testimony? We accept the evidence of witnesses in a court of law, and find a verdict upon it in matters of supreme moment. Such is often the only way known to man, and the sole means of arriving at the truth. We require in our witnesses that they be honest, truthful, unprejudiced and actual observers of that which they allege. No critic denies the honesty and truthfulness of the Apostles and of St Paul. That they were unprejudiced we have ample testimony. We have seen the state of their minds at the death of Christ, and the impossibility of their having any idea that He would rise again. It was to their interests to forsake and deny Christ, and against their interests to allege His Resurrection, for that meant persecution and death. They declare that they saw Him alive again and conversed with Him. If it be alleged that they were simple and unlettered men, the less is it likely that they could have evolved the extraordinary idea of a self-worked resurrection. And with the difficulties which are alleged, such as that "it was an age of superstition," that they were the "subjects of illusion and hallucination," we shall deal hereafter.

What is the value of the witness of the Apostles?

The Witnesses trustworthy

There is no escaping from the fact that we have the strongest of human testimony to the fact of the Resurrection, and only by impugning the value of all human testimony can we declare that Jesus did not rise again from the dead. To deny it is to deny the value of all evidence, to destroy all history, and to take away the very ground-work of all scientific discovery. If the evidence of the healthy senses is to be refused in the case of the Resurrection, what is its value for scientific observations? With the question of miracles we shall deal later on.

And now let us consider for a short time the peculiar position occupied in the first century of the Christian era, by the preaching of the Resurrection. It was the one pre-dominant thought in every mind. So unique, so unprecedented an event had struck every mind, filled every thought.

The Resur-
rection the
teaching of
the First
Century

Writ large upon every page of those first hundred years is the one word "Resurrexit." It is not so much the Divinity of Christ, the Incarnation, the Blessed Trinity, that occupy men's thoughts. It is the Resurrection. The first action of the followers of Christ after His Ascension, was to choose a witness to this fact in the person of Matthias. The first Christian sermon ever preached was by St Peter, and its theme was, "Christ is risen." "This Jesus did God raise

up, whereof we are all witnesses."* SS. Peter and John were arrested at the Beautiful Gate of the Temple by the priests and Sadducees, "being grieved that they taught the people, and preached in Jesus the resurrection from the dead."† How absurd all this would be, if a merely spiritual resurrection were intended? And when St Peter, as the result of this arrest, stood before the Sanhedrin, he cried out, "Be it known to you all, and to all the people of Israel, that by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ of Nazareth, whom you crucified, whom God hath raised from the dead, even by Him, this man standeth here before you whole."‡ St Peter here draws a parallel between the Crucifixion and the Resurrection. He puts both upon the same plane of objective, physical, and real occurrences. Without this, his contrast has no meaning. Both were sensible and actual facts—the Resurrection as real and as much an object of the senses as the Crucifixion. Words cannot be plainer. The Apostles meant what St Paul meant, the rising again to life of the dead body of Christ, and they declare that they had seen that risen Body in the flesh. Polycarp, the disciple of St John, and Bishop of Smyrna, who laid down his life for Christ, tells us of the Resurrection as a

* Acts i. 32.

† Acts iv. 2.

‡ Acts iv. 10.

Evidence of
Early Chris-
tian Writers

fact.* He had heard all about it from the lips of an eye-witness. Irenæus, the Bishop of Lyons, was a disciple of Polycarp, and he tells us the same story.† Justin Martyr and Aristides, in the year A.D. 150, proclaim the Resurrection to the Roman Emperor; and, would time permit, we could quote from numerous writers of those early days, all of whom proclaim the Resurrection as a fact, and all of whom were in a position to sift and examine the evidence. Many of them were contemporaries of the Apostles; many of them were intimate with those who had conversed with the Apostles. All have the same story. "Jesus rose again in His Body from the grave." These are Christian witnesses, but they are Pagan converts—converted by the Resurrection. And if it be asked, "Where is the purely Pagan testimony to the Resurrection?" we would make answer, "If a Pagan could announce the Resurrection of Christ as a fact and still remain a Pagan, he would destroy the value of his own evidence, and prove himself untrustworthy." The best Pagan evidence we can adduce is that of those who on the strength of it became Christians, as did Polycarp. Time will not allow us to enter in detail into the many proofs that may be adduced to prove the Resurrection as a fact. We can but lightly touch on one or two more. The very conversion of so

Conversion
of Jews

* *Ad. Phil.*, cap. ix.

† *Adv. Hæres.*

many Jews at a time when the evidence was fresh and the eye-witnesses still living, is a striking proof of the historicity of Christ's rising. Of all the peoples of the earth at that time, none were so strictly monotheistic as the Jews. The very idea of idolatry was abhorrent to them. Yet we find in that first century countless numbers of them embracing Christianity and worshipping in Jesus the Incarnate God. What could have induced them, not merely to become His followers, but through the curse of the Cross, to see in Him Jehovah of Sinai? What could have induced them to adore a human being, had they not beheld in Him the glory of the Godhead? And how did they recognise Him? Only by His Resurrection. Only by Life conquering Death in His Person. They are a standing witness to the fact of His rising again. But they are not the only ones. What was it that urged the Pagans to give up their religion of pleasure and their life of sensuality? Never was the world more steeped in licentiousness than at this period. Yet in thousands they embrace Christianity, which called for self-denial, which converted their friends into enemies, made them the object of persecution and suffering, and even led them to the martyr's death? It was because they saw in the Crucified Slave, the Lord of Heaven and Earth. And how did they recognise Him? By His Resurrection.

**Pagan
Conversions**

Well has St Paul expressed it when he wrote, "But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews, indeed, a stumbling-block, and unto the Gentiles, foolishness."* To the Jews there was the accursed death upon the tree—to the Gentiles the degradation of a slave's execution. That Jesus was recognised as God, even the Pagan writer, Pliny, the Governor of Bithynia, bears witness, when he writes in the year A.D. 112, and tells the Emperor that the converts sing hymns to Christ as God.†

To one more historical witness of the Resurrection we must confine ourselves—the institution of Sunday as a memorial of Christ's rising from the dead. From the very commencement of the Christian Church—from the very week after Easter Day, the followers of Christ set aside the Sunday as a memorial of that wonderful event, and they met together to celebrate it. As we have said, the idea of a self-worked resurrection was unknown to the Jews. Yet within a few weeks of the alleged occurrence they are proclaiming it and celebrating it. Nothing but the actual fact could have induced them to state it, for whence could they have conceived so strange a notion? Sunday worship is thus an historical monument as real and as instructive as are the pyramids and obelisks of

**Sunday
Worship**

**Easter
Festival**

* 1 Corinthians i. 23.

† *Epp. L.*, x. 97.

Egypt. There is yet another important consideration with regard to Sunday. Not only was and is it a memorial of the Resurrection, but it is a living witness to the manner in which those early Christians regarded the Person of Christ. It proves that they knew Him as God. On Mount Sinai had Jehovah given the emphatic order, "Remember the Sabbath day that thou keep it holy," and from that moment to the present the Jews have kept it with rigorous scrupulousness. Yet the Hebrew converts to Christianity abolished the Sabbath, and for it substituted the Sunday. They still worshipped Jehovah, and yet they dared to set aside His express command. There was not one word in their Scriptures or tradition that warranted so grave an action.

What could have emboldened them so to do? The recognition that Jesus of Nazareth and Jehovah of Sinai were One and the same "I am." And how could they know this save by His Resurrection? The epistles ascribed to Barnabas, and written in the first century, the writings of Ignatius at the beginning of the second, the works of Justin Martyr (A.D. 150), of Melito (A.D. 170), and of Tertullian (A.D. 180), all bear witness to what we have said. Such is but a small fragment of the mass of historical evidence which can be offered to prove the Resurrection as a fact well

Abolition of
the Sabbath
and substitu-
tion of
Sunday

Early
Writers on
Sunday
Worship

and widely known. No event of bygone days has so powerful and such convincing testimony in its support. We have not dwelt upon the annual Easter Festival kept for over nineteen hundred years, nor upon the relics of those early days in private houses, in the catacombs, and in the churches; nor yet upon the prayers and ritual, the daily salutation amongst Christians, or the Symbol of the Apostles. From amongst numerous writings that have come down to our days in fragments or enshrined in quotations and extracts, we have chosen only three. To pursue the proof would lengthen out too much the task before us. Sufficient has been given to place the fact of Christ's Resurrection beyond dispute. Let us now listen to some of the objections that are urged against this Christian evidence. We are told that it was an age of superstition, and that men were accustomed to regard as miraculous, events which modern science has demonstrated to be explicable by the ordinary laws of nature. Whilst denying the possibility of miracles, these critics bid us look at the small influence which the alleged miracles of Christ produced, and thus see how superstitious men were, for, say they, unless these wonders were very common, those of Christ must have worked a great effect, if they happened. There are three points in this objection which need consideration—the impos-

Objections—

It was an

Age of

Superstition

sibility of miracles, the small effect of Christ's miracles, and the nature of the Resurrection. It is impossible here to enter into a lengthy discussion of the possibility of the miraculous God, the Intelligent and Omnipotent First Cause, the Author of Nature and its laws, would no longer be God, if He were unable to alter or suspend those laws, or bring into play powers of another order. Yet the miraculous, as S. Thomas says, is but "an effect of divine power, surpassing wholly the course of nature, or an effect of divine omnipotence beyond the power of any created cause."* And Professor Huxley has declared, "No one is entitled to say *à priori* that any given so-called miraculous event is impossible." †

How shall the finite dare to limit the Infinite, and say to Him, "Thus far shalt Thou go and no farther"? With regard to the comparatively small results that flowed from the miracles wrought by Christ, we are willing to admit that this was due to the excessive superstition of the times. But that only leads us to a consideration of our third point, the Resurrection, which is alleged by these critics to be on a par with most of the other so-called miracles—in other words, no miracle at all. If, however, it

The small
Influence of
Christ's
Miracles in
His Lifetime

* *Contra Gentiles*, I. III. c. 101.

† *Science and Christian Tradition*, p. 133.

was an age of superstition, and so engrossed with the miraculous, that these wonders ceased to be of any telling force upon the minds of men, how comes it that the Resurrection alone worked so marvellous an effect, and attracted so much notice? How comes it that men, whom the miracles of Jesus did not move in His lifetime, are so struck by His Resurrection as to give up honourable positions and friends and home, aye, and even life itself, and embrace Christianity? Only because this stupendous miracle was absolutely unique, absolutely unprecedented, and was the unmistakable sign of Heaven that Jesus of Nazareth was the Lord of Life and Death. No mere vision, no mere myth, no mere rising in power, can explain the wonders worked by the Resurrection. Only itself as a fact can explain all the marvels that are due to it. But it is urged by other critics, "The Apostles removed the Body" "The Apostles removed the lifeless Body, and then alleged the Resurrection." Few, very few, are the writers who charge the Apostles with want of good faith and insincerity. Yet such would have been their character had they so acted. All that we know of them stamps them as sincere, honest, God-fearing men. Let us, however, consider the objection. Either they believed that Christ would rise again, or they did not so believe. If the former, there was no need for their interfer-

ence ; if the latter, all motives were absent for such action on their part, nay, there were the strongest reasons to deter them from any such an attempt. They had nothing to gain by stealing the Body and asserting His Resurrection. They had proved themselves cowards and unfaithful, for they had deserted their Master, and they were in fear for themselves, and so had hidden themselves from popular gaze. They had all to lose in the attempt, for there was the risk of detection, and in any case the persecuting vengeance of the Sanhedrin and the hatred of their fellow Jews. These were not the men to attempt to steal the Body, and then, knowing that it was all a fraud, to proclaim at the peril of their lives, that their crucified Master had risen again. But there is one circumstance which renders such an action upon their part impossible, and which, at the same time, demonstrates the Resurrection as a fact, and the empty tomb as explicable only by the reality of that Resurrection. It is the placing

**The Guard
at the mouth
of the
Sepulchre** of the Jewish guard at the mouth of the tomb. It is a common Christian and Hebrew tradition, and is mentioned in the Gospel attributed to St Matthew—a document which, whether written as we now possess it by him or not, is at all events a written historical record coming down from the time of eye-witnesses or their immediate and personal friends. According to it, we are told that the

priests had a guard of soldiers stationed at the tomb—not because they feared that Jesus would rise again—that idea they scouted as ridiculous, even though they were aware of the prophecy of Christ—but because, as they tell us, by so doing it would be impossible for the disciples of Christ to remove His Body, and then assert that It had risen again. After taking all these pains, is it credible that they did not look into the tomb on that Saturday morning, and make sure that the Body they had come to guard was really there? The Apostles might have stolen It on Friday night, and how foolish to keep guard over the tomb if they were not sure about the presence of the Body! So we may be sure they knew It was there. Yet on Sunday morning, despite their guard, It had gone, and the tomb was empty. What had become of It? Even if there were some life left in It, there was no possibility of escape, for the mouth of the grave was sealed with heavy stones, and there were the soldiers to guard It, and the Sufferer must have been too feeble to escape. If It were dead, how could It come forth, save on the supposition that It was miraculously restored to life, and that It was endowed with new and wonderful properties not ordinarily pertaining to the human frame? This tradition renders any fraud on the part of the Apostles an impossibility, and, as we have said, it demonstrates the fact of the Resurrection. Some

critics would have us believe with Réville that the Sanhedrin, fearing lest the Apostles should steal the Body and then announce Its rising again, had removed It and hid It away. But if this were the fact, why did not the Sanhedrin confound and ridicule the Apostles when they did allege the Resurrection, by producing the Body, or, at least, by publicly announcing what had become of It. Nothing was easier either six weeks or six months afterwards. Yet nothing of the kind was attempted, and for the best of reasons, because no such removal by the Sanhedrin had ever taken place.

2nd.—Proof from the Writings of St Paul

And now that we have considered what we may call the purely historical proofs of the Resurrection, let us turn to the evidence offered us by St Paul. We have already seen what the Apostles and what he meant by the Resurrection they preached in common. It was the return to endless life of the dead Body that had rested in the tomb. It was a bodily resurrection. When then St Paul, or indeed any other writer, tells us that he saw the risen Christ, there is only one meaning to be attached to his words,—that with his fleshly eyes he saw the Body that had

St Paul
declared the
Bodily Re-
surrection of
Christ, and
that he had
seen Christ
in the body

been dead, alive again. To intend anything but this would be deliberately to employ language that implied one thing whilst meaning quite another. This would be dishonest and in the highest degree criminal. And as we have seen, there is hardly any critic, however hostile to Christianity he may be, who would assert that of the Apostles or of St Paul. Now let us consider the evidence given us by St Paul himself in writings which the "higher critics" declare unquestionably to have been written by him. And we will take the view held by the more rigorous school, and ask what St Paul says in the six epistles which alone they hold to be undoubtedly genuine. We refer to the 1st Epistle to the Thessalonians, written in A.D. 53, the two epistles to the Corinthians, bearing date A.D. 57, those to the Romans and Galatians of the year A.D. 58, and that to the Philippians, penned in A.D. 62. We have carefully searched all the thirteen epistles attributed to St Paul, and in them we find twenty-one references to the Resurrection. It is a curious and significant fact that, of that number, no fewer than nineteen occur in the very epistles recognised by these critics. There can then be no doubt of the certainty in St Paul's mind that Jesus rose again, and it is moreover in these very epistles that he declares so emphatically that he has seen the risen Saviour.

The Epistles
generally
allowed to be
Genuine

Nineteen
references to
the
Resurrection

Words cannot be clearer. A stronger witness we cannot have. It is impossible here to enter into a detailed account of the life of St Paul.

**Character of
St Paul**

He had been a persecutor of the Christians. A fervent Jew, a zealot, a member of the Sanhedrin, he had learned all that could be said against Christ and his followers, and in his zeal he hastened to crush the newly-born community. He was a man of learning, a lawyer versed in the Torah. Some of his own indisputable records have reached us. Yet suddenly this fervent persecutor becomes one of the persecuted, this ardent Jewish monotheist who had reviled and derided Jesus of Nazareth, becomes a foremost believer, and a champion of the Resurrection. Why? What has

**His
Conversion**

happened? He tells us himself in these six epistles. "Am I not an apostle? Have I not seen Jesus Christ our Lord?"* "And, last of all, he was seen also by me, as by one born out of due time."† He had disbelieved in the Resurrection, but his own eyes had convinced him of his error, for with them he had beheld the risen Jesus. What stronger motive for his change could he assert or have? And again he says, "For I give you to understand, brethren, that the Gospel which was preached by me is not according to man. For neither did I receive it of man, nor did I learn

* 1 Corinthians ix. 1.

† 1 Corinthians xv. 8.

it; but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. For you have heard of my conversation in time past in the Jews' religion; how that beyond measure I persecuted the Church of God, and wasted it. And I made progress in the Jews' religion above many of my equals in my own nation, being more abundantly zealous for the traditions of my fathers. But when it pleased Him who separated me from my mother's womb, and called me, by His grace, to reveal His Son in me, that I might preach Him among the Gentiles, immediately I condescended not to flesh and blood, neither went I to Jerusalem to the Apostles who were before me; but I went into Arabia, and again I returned to Damascus."*

It is evident that in this passage St Paul "Reveal His Son in Me" is speaking of the result of his seeing Christ. He tells us that formerly he was a persecutor and an unbeliever, but that God in His mercy had enlightened his mind, and caused him to see in Jesus the very Son of God, and no impostor. And he tells us also that this mental change came over him at or near Damascus, for so much is implied in the expression, "and again I returned to Damascus." When, then, an attempt is made to explain this quotation as referring directly to the appearance of Christ to St Paul on the way to Damascus, violence is done to it. And still more is this the case when,

* Galations i. 11-17.

as some critics state, St Paul is here represented as giving us to understand that his sight of the risen Christ was by mental illumination only. To say that the expression "reveal his Son in me" refers to the appearance of Christ as a mere illumination of the mind, is clearly to misunderstand the writer. Schmiedel admits that this passage in no way excludes the alleged appearance on the way to Damascus. Later we shall consider the accounts of that incident given us in the Acts of the Apostles, and we shall find that they are mutually corroborative.

It has been urged that St Paul proved himself wanting in judgment when, as he declares, after his conversion, he did not seek for further advice and enlightenment by going up to Jerusalem to confer with the Apostles. But is that so? He had learned all that was to be said against Christ and His followers. He had been told that the alleged resurrection was a fraud; and now, with his own eyes, he sees the risen Christ, and from His lips receives the divine commission. Would it not have been to doubt the reality of his experience, and the words of Jesus, in Whom He saw at last the very Son of God, had he gone at once to Jerusalem and sought for further corroboration? He was so sure of what had happened that not a shade of doubt remained in his mind. And that he was no rash or head-

strong convert is shown by his retiring to Arabia. He did not at once rush into missionary work. Yet his conviction must have been very strong, for he who was the pet of the Sanhedrin, the leader of the anti-Christians—he forsook position and fortune and popular esteem, home and friends—all, for the sake of conscience. The evidence must indeed have been telling that could work so great a change. Three years later, A.D. 38, as he informs us,* he spent a fortnight with St Peter, and met St James, and they were in harmony on the subject of the Resurrection. Fourteen years later (A.D. 49) he was in Jerusalem, and found himself in perfect harmony with SS. Peter, James, and John. They all had seen the risen Jesus. This visit he records in his Epistle to the Galatians,† and he further tells us that all three “gave me and Barnabas the right hand of fellowship.”‡ SS. Peter and James, John, and Paul, are all witnesses to the bodily Resurrection of their Lord and Master. Their experiences were identical.

Now let us turn to the Acts of the Apostles, written by the companion and friend of St Paul, about the year A.D. 79. He narrates the well-known account of the appearance of Jesus to St Paul on the way to Damascus. This he does in the ninth chapter.

The Acts of the Apostles

* Galatians i. 18.

† Galatians ii. 1 and 2.

‡ Galatians ii. 9.

Later, in the twenty-second chapter, he tells us how the Apostle himself recounted to the Sanhedrin, in the year A.D. 58, the same story, and how, as we have already seen, he made the famous appeal to the Pharisees. In the twenty-sixth chapter once again St Luke describes his Master as relating the appearance at Damascus in the presence of Festus and Agrippa in the year A.D. 60. All these narratives are corroborated by the Apostle himself in the first chapter of the Galatians, as we have already seen. True it is that in all these accounts we are not told in so many words that it was there and then that St Paul had seen his Lord, but it is implied in the words which refer to his companions, in which we are informed, as by contrast, that they, indeed, saw nobody—implying that their leader did. And Ananias, when he visited St Paul, said to him, “Brother Saul, the Lord Jesus hath sent me, He that appeared to thee in the way as thou camest.”* And Barnabas confirmed this when he said, on presenting St Paul to the Apostles, “how he (Paul) had seen the Lord, and that he had spoken to him.”

There can be no doubt that the Apostle of the Gentiles, when he says, “Have not I seen Jesus Christ the Lord?” is referring to the Damascus episode. But it is alleged by some of the critics that this appearance was only a vision or revelation—that it was subjective, not objective,

Objection—
It was only
a Vision

* Acts ix. 17.

and this they allege because St Paul frequently refers to visions, revelations, and trances. They declare him to have been so absorbed by these visions that he could not distinguish between them and reality, and so they put the Damascus episode into this category. It is, however, very far from true that St Paul could not and did not clearly distinguish between a vision and a physical objective appearance. He is, on the contrary, most explicit in declaring when he is the subject of such experiences, and he is most careful to announce the appearance on the way to Damascus as wholly and entirely different from vision or revelation or trance. When he is speaking from the castle steps in Jerusalem, in the year A.D. 49, and addressing the Jews, he tells them of his seeing Jesus at Damascus; and then, referring to a subsequent occasion he says, "And it came to pass when I was come again to Jerusalem, and was praying in the temple, that I was in a trance, and saw him."* Can distinction be clearer? Surely St Paul here discriminates between a trance and an objective reality. And if it be objected that this is not in his own writing, let us turn to his second epistle to the Corinthians and the 12th chapter, where he says, "If I must glory (it is not expedient indeed :) but I will come to the visions and revelations of the Lord." And yet from these visions he excludes what would have been

* Acts xxii. 17 and 18.

his greatest, had it been one, the appearance on the road to Damascus, and contents himself with referring to an occasion when he was carried up to the third heaven. Clearly, he did not consider the appearance of Jesus as a vision or revelation. And he is most particular when narrating the vision referred to in this 12th chapter, to tell us that he did not know whether he was in the body or out of it. Who shall say that St Paul cannot distinguish the mental from the physical—the subjective from the objective? Then he goes on to tell us, “And lest the greatness of the revelations should exalt me, there was given me a sting of my flesh, an angel of Satan to buffet me.” Even this passage is quoted as a proof of the subjection of St Paul’s mind to hallucinations and delusions, for there are critics who tell us that this sting of the flesh means epilepsy, and that, consequently, St Paul was an epileptic

Objection—
St Paul was
an Epileptic

visionary, and his Damascus episode was the outcome of this disease. The

Greek word employed to express “*sting of the flesh*” is *skolops*, and it has no reference whatever to such a complaint. Its translation is rather “stake” than sting. We do not, however, propose at this moment to pursue the connotation of the word—a pursuit which is absolutely disastrous for the critics who would read epilepsy into it. We prefer, for the purposes of this argument, to accept the meaning of the word as

implying epilepsy. Starting, therefore, from these critics' standpoint, let us follow out the matter. This epilepsy, St Paul tells us, was given to him after his translation to heaven as a means to keep him humble. Good! He tells us that this translation took place fourteen years before he wrote the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. The "higher critics" tell us that the date of that epistle is A.D. 57. Now, taking fourteen from fifty-seven, we arrive at the year 43 as the date at which he became an epileptic. His conversion occurred, according to the majority of these same critics, in the year 35—or, according to Harnack, the greatest of modern critics, in 30. How, then, could the appearance of Jesus to St Paul on the road to Damascus be the outcome of an epileptically diseased mind, seeing that, according to these same critics, he did not become an epileptic until eight, or, according to Harnack, thirteen, years after the Damascus incident? The critics surely have cut the ground from under their own feet. It seems as though any explanation, save that given by him concerned, is to be accepted; and yet none save his own, will explain what happened at Damascus. Mr Gould, in his *Concise History of Christianity*, suggests that spasms of the heart is meant. We do not see how that helps the rationalist cause at all. St Paul's evidence thus stands the severest criticism, and comes out triumphant. He saw the

risen Jesus in the flesh ; and when he tells us, in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, that his own experience was but one amongst many ; even had we no other evidence, we know that he meant to say that Jesus had as truly appeared in the flesh alive after his crucifixion to St Peter, the eleven, the five hundred, and to St James, as to himself. And all this, he tells us in that fifteenth chapter, he had learnt from the lips of these very witnesses. "For I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received."* And he puts the disciples' experience on the self-same footing as his own, and we have seen that his was objective and real, Jesus in the flesh and Paul in the flesh. We cannot conclude the evidence of the apostle of the Gentiles without a passing reference to his appeal to the five hundred. "Then was He seen by more than five hundred brethren at once: of whom many remain until this present, and some are fallen asleep." It was to the Corinthians he wrote this—to the inhabitants of a city famous in the Roman Empire—the city whither flocked thousands to see the games that have become immortalised. It was a dangerous thing to do, if those five hundred had never existed, or if there were none still living. Yet St Paul knew that what he said was true, and he fearlessly declared

* 1 Corinthians xv. 3.

it. There was no great difficulty in verifying or disproving his statement at that time, for intercourse between the great cities of the Roman Empire was frequent and easy. As Gibbon tells us, in his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*,* there were excellent roads and a splendid system of posts in those days, and the Corinthians could easily have tested the truth or falsehood of the statement. St Paul knew that his statement was true and capable of proof, or he never would have made it. Need we pursue his evidence further? There can be no doubt that if we had nothing but his six epistles, they are more than enough to demonstrate the Resurrection as an historical and incontrovertible fact.

3rd.—*Proof from the Gospels.*

Lastly, we come to the evidence of the Gospels. It is, indeed, superfluous, but we will briefly consider it. Once again, we desire to call attention to the fact that we do not treat of the question of inspiration. We are dealing with all the writings of the New Testament which concern us, as merely human, historical documents. It is, moreover, impossible, in the time at our command, to enter into a discussion of the question of authorship and composition. For the present we must content ourselves with saying, that,

The Four
Gospels

* Chapter ii.

according to the best evidence, these Synoptic Gospels, with the fourth Gospel, come down to us from the first century of Christianity, and that they were written, if not by eye-witnesses, at least by the companions of eye-witnesses of that which they record. They were widely circulated, and accepted as a practically correct record of the events they narrate. They were written as mere memoirs for those already in possession of the facts, not as complete chronological records, not as an explanation and defence of the Christian faith for non-believers. It would be useless to narrate in detail all they say of the Resurrection of Christ. That is matter of common knowledge. All alike allege the death of Jesus, the empty tomb, the appearances of the risen Christ in Jerusalem or in Galilee. It is a simple narrative, ingenuous and sincere. There is no attempt at collaboration ; no effort to astonish the reader ; no rhetorical expressions of wonderment. Their very apparent discrepancies only affect details, and are a guarantee to us that the witnesses are trustworthy. In a court of law, we should suspect collusion if the witnesses agreed in every minute particular. We expect and require only agreement upon the main point. And this we have in the Gospels. Their apparent disagreement only touches minor points, and is capable of explanation.

Their His-
torical Value

What, then, are the objections to the Gospel story? We are told that they are not the recorded experiences of eye-witnesses themselves. Did opportunity permit, we should disprove this statement. Suffice it now to say that they are the work of eye-witnesses, or of those who were intimate with them. St Matthew was an eye-witness, and so was St John; and St Mark was the interpreter of St Peter, and St Luke the companion of St Paul. These Gospels were written at a time when all the evidence was fresh in men's minds, and when a false statement was easy of correction. They are the most valuable historical records coming down to us from the very time when the incidents they record were matter of public knowledge. What better evidence can we have? On another occasion we may be privileged to enter more fully into this matter, and show that the very difficulties alleged against these writings are in reality the best evidence in their support. The Gospels corroborate all we have said, and are corroborated by it. For instance, the apparent differences as to the time when the visits were made to the empty tomb, arise from a false impression that the writers refer to one and the same visit. Hence, we have the difficulty as to the persons present at the tomb, the discourses of the angels, their number

Objection—
They do not
come from
eye-
witnesses

Visits to the
Tomb

and position, and many similar questions. They are all capable of a reasonable and natural explanation. We only regret that time does not now permit us to enter upon these matters. Weitzsäcker, for example, has declined to accept the statement of the empty tomb on the ground that the most reliable witness, St Paul, never mentions it. But surely he tells us that Christ was crucified, dead and buried, and that on the third day he rose again with the same body that had been laid into the grave. What is that but the empty tomb?

Weitz-
säcker's
Objection
that St Paul
does not refer
to the empty
Tomb

General Objections

Before concluding, we shall refer to the principal theories which have been propounded to explain away the Resurrection as a fact. And, first of all, we come again across the Swoon Theory of Schleiermacher, Paulus and Gfrörer. We have dealt with it so far as regards the death of Jesus.

General
Objections

The Swoon
Theory

Let us now briefly consider it in its bearing upon the Resurrection. It is asserted that the insensible but animate body of Jesus revived in the tomb and re-appeared to the disciples, thus giving rise in their minds to the idea of the Resurrection. We have already seen that Jesus was unquestionably dead; but accepting, for the

purpose of argument, that He was not, with Strauss we would ask, how it was possible, after all He had suffered, that Christ should so appear to His disciples as to convince them that He had risen again? His enfeebled and suffering frame must have shewn them that He was no risen Conqueror of Death, but merely a wreck saved from the final throes of Mortality. This theory will not explain the Resurrection.

Then we have Renan's suggestion, an echo of that of Celsus, that it was the fervour and imagination of St Mary Magdalen that inspired the Apostles' minds with the idea. She could not bring herself to imagine that One so gentle, good, and noble, could remain in the grip of Death, and so she imagined that He had risen, and her enthusiasm carried away the minds and hearts of the Apostles. The stern evidence of fact is against this theory, for we know that the Apostles refused to believe the evidence of all the women, and that they were only convinced of its truth when they themselves had seen and handled the risen Christ.

Nor is Keim's explanation any better, in his celebrated "Telegram from Heaven." In his anxiety to defend Jesus and the Apostles, he tells us, that God infused a special knowledge into the minds of the Apostles, whereby they knew that Jesus was in Heaven, sitting in glory at the right

Renan's
Theory
about
St Mary
Magdalen

Keim's
Theory of
the "Tele-
gram from
Heaven"

hand of God, and that as a result of this information they had visions of Jesus risen, and so came to believe that they had seen him alive again and in the flesh. This is only to substitute one miracle for another; and if miracles are to be allowed at all, why not the more probable one that Jesus had truly risen from the grave? Moreover, Keim's theory gives the divine sanction to the life and teaching of Jesus, and we know that He claimed the Godhead when He said, "Amen, Amen, I say unto you, before Abraham was, I Am." And again, did He not reply to Philip when the latter asked Him "Lord, show us the Father," "So long a time have I been with you, and have you not known me, Philip? he that seeth me, seeth the Father also."* Thus the "telegram" is the divine approbation of this claim, and Jesus is God, and the miracle of the Resurrection ceases to be a difficulty. This theory, moreover, makes God responsible for the delusions of the Apostles when they imagined they saw Jesus risen in the flesh, and responsible, too, for the wholly wrong impression on which Christianity is built, if Christ be not risen from the dead. It will not stand.

Lastly, we come to the pet explanation of to-day, the celebrated Vision Theory, held in one form or another by Schmiedel, Strauss, and Pfeleiderer. According to it, the Apostles had subjective visions

The Vision
Theory

* St John's Gospel, chap. xiv., vv. 8 and 9.

of the risen Jesus, which they firmly believed to be real and objective, and on the strength of these they preached the Resurrection. But that visions of so unexpected and unprecedented an event should have arisen, mental preparation and much time were needed. We have already seen that, far from any such condition existing, the minds of the Apostles were in a state of despair, faithlessness, and dismay. There was everything to prevent the birth of such an idea, and nothing to give rise to it. And, whether we accept three days or six weeks as the time during which the mental preparation was being achieved, the time is wholly inadequate. If, against the evidence of history, we grant them many months during which they worked out this idea, we are still no nearer an explanation, for, during that extended time, they had opportunity for calm reflection; and it is inconceivable that they should unanimously have conceived so extraordinary an idea. And even granting that such were the case, would not the sealed tomb and the ridicule of the Sanhedrin and Jewish people have brought honest men to their senses? If, again, contrary to history, we allow that they departed to Galilee on Good Friday, how could they hear of the alleged Resurrection by the third day? Nay, how could they even have reached that distant district by the Sunday? But again, even had they reached it, and we grant them an extended

time for the development of the idea, once again we are confronted by the sealed tomb and the sober facts on their return to Jerusalem. If they all were suffering from excitement, when that cooled down, as in time it must have done, human experience shows us that one or other of the company would have given away the story, and made it the ridicule of Judaism. Yet far from that is the fact. They persevered for years amid obloquy and persecution in declaring that Jesus had truly risen, and that they had seen Him, and for this they laid down their lives in martyrdom. The Vision Theory will not stand examination and criticism.

Only the Resurrection as a fact can explain all the historical testimony we have adduced in the origin of Christianity, the conversion of Jews and Pagans, the institution of Sunday, the conversion of St Paul, the records of the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. No fact of history is better or so well attested as the Resurrection of Jesus Christ in the flesh. Nineteen hundred years ago He hung upon the tree of shame; His head was crowned with thorns, and from His hands and feet and Sacred Body flowed streams of blood. On that awful Friday was heard the farewell cry from His dying lips, "Father, into Thy hands I commit my spirit for Thy work is finished." And He bowed His head to give the human

race the kiss of Peace. To-day, He is in our midst, no longer crowned with thorns, but wearing upon His brow the diadem of His people's love. From His hands and feet flow streams of grace and mercy, and His face is refulgent with the light of Love. Gathered around Him is a multitude, countless as the sands upon the seashore, and from their lips and hearts arises the song, "Amen. Benediction and glory, and wisdom and thanksgiving, honour and power and strength to our God for ever and ever, Amen."* And gathered there too, in reverent homage, are the rationalist thinkers of every age, and from their lips and from their hearts goes up the cry, "Hail, Thou Godlike Man!" God speed the day when they too, hand in hand with the Christian believer, may exclaim no longer, "Hail, Thou Godlike Man," but, rather, "Hail Thou God, made Man."

* Apocalypse vii. 12.

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PRINTED BY
OLIVER AND BOYD
EDINBURGH

WESTMINSTER LECTURES

EDITED BY REV. FRANCIS AVELING, D.D.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

BY THE

RIGHT REV. MGR. CANON MOYES, D.D.

LONDON AND EDINBURGH
SANDS & COMPANY

ST LOUIS, MO.

B. HERDER, 17 SOUTH BROADWAY

1906



P R E F A C E

IN the list of lectures delivered at Westminster Cathedral Hall, the first had for its subject the "Proofs for the Existence of God."

To deal exhaustively with the proofs as a whole would have required not a lecture but a treatise. What the reader will find in the pages that follow is not an attempt to treat the subject fully or technically, but an effort to indicate in a broad and general way, the lines on which it is thought that the proofs of God's existence may be conveniently stated.

It is a need of our rational nature to interrogate the things which we see, and to ask the reason of their existence. And if this is true with regard to any single phenomenon, or group of phenomena, it must be emphatically more so when we are face to face with the Universe as a whole. Hence the great question as to the origin and destiny of the Universe—the *whence*, the *why*, and the *whither*—is inextinguishable

in the human mind. Man from the earliest times when he looked out with intelligent eyes upon the world, has never ceased to ask it. In the history of human thought, especially in its higher levels, as in the Greek civilisation, the best and ablest intellects of the race have been turned towards its solution. The acquired results of their labours have been happily handed down to us in the great schools of Scholastic philosophy, in which we have what has been aptly described as "the main line of European thought."¹ On the great question just alluded to, there is nothing in the "by-path" philosophies which is ever likely to invalidate their conclusions. The great work of St Thomas and the Schoolmen was not by any process of thought-spinning to originate a new philosophy, but rather to gather up into a formulated system all that was best and soundest in the Greek and Arabian schools which interpreted the thought of the ancient civilisations. Scholastic philosophy is thus much more a channel than a source. We esteem it, not merely because it is Thomistic or Scholastic, but because the great natural verities which it presents to us in terms of precision are the common property of

¹ Professor Caldecott of King's College, and H. R. M'Intosh, M.A., *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, p. 10.

mankind from the simple fact that they are the thought-out conclusions from the common sense of mankind, at work from the beginning upon the great problems of our origin and destiny. We prize it, because it comes as the heir of the ages, and represents the acquired results of the highest and clearest thinking in the life and history of the race. Metaphysical research has ever been its chief and absorbing aim, and its soundness therein remains untouched by the fact that in the physical domain, in which inductions upon ever-widening areas of facts must necessarily make their progressive report, many of its conclusions have been naturally long since evacuated. For this reason, most of the arguments set forth in the following pages have proceeded substantially on the traditional lines of the Scholastic philosophy, and to it, rather than to the somewhat free and feeble handling of those arguments by the writer, is due whatever worth or cogency they may be found to possess.

J. MOYES.

Note.—The few questions that were put to the lecturer on the occasion of the delivery of the lecture at London, Aberdeen, and Edinburgh have been dealt with in the text, and consequently are not included in an appendix.



THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

“I CANNOT see God. But I see that He must exist ; for if He did not, I could not see anything. There would not be anything for me to see, and I should not be here with eyes to see it.” That would represent roughly the argument which arises in the mind of men as they gaze upon the world around them. It is built upon a conviction that the world and men have been made—that they did not make themselves—and that they have need of a God to have made them. But why should there be any such need? Why should the universe need to have been made at all? Might it not have existed always and from ever, with man (or his elements to be developed later on) as a part of it? Might it not exist of itself by its own forces and laws, without need of anything either to create or to sustain it?

The answer to this question is to be found in the proofs of the existence of God ; and a statement of these, in very rough outline, is attempted in the following pages.

The proofs of God's existence are various and manifold. They are differently appreciated by different people, according to their mental taste or aptitude. A proof which is felt to be all that is clear and conclusive to some, may seem to be vague and unsatisfactory to others. For that reason it is well to consider here a number of proofs, leaving each mind to assimilate most the one which most appeals to it. No doubt, the considerations which make for the existence of God are innumerable, but the main proofs as traditionally handed down to us by those who have thought much upon the subject are comparatively few.

I.—*Argument from Motion.*

The first is drawn from the fact of Motion. Here we are at once face to face with a fact of cosmic magnitude. There is nothing which enters so much into the whole structure of the universe and is found so much everywhere and in everything, as Motion. On this point Science bears eloquent witness. Nature is truly described as an inexhaustible storehouse of wonders. Science—which is but another word for man discovering the laws and secrets of Nature—stands with the telescope in one hand

and the microscope in the other. The one turned upwards to scan the immeasurably great, reveals to us worlds upon worlds executing their marvellous dance in the realms of boundless space, and moving with unthinkable speed along paths so vast that their distance can only be counted by the years which a ray of their light would take to reach us. The other turned downwards to scrutinise the immeasurably small, reveals worlds within worlds of organic structures living and moving within a compass so small that thousands of them might be lost within the area of a pin-head. But all of them, great and small, from the remotest star to the tiniest microbe, are in motion, and fulfilling their part in the universal law of movement. Or, to look at the same truth from another point of view, motion is of all things in Nature the one which is most tellingly brought home to our senses. For in-
Examples
of Motion
stance, I raise my eyes to the sun shining at noonday, and my sight is filled and flooded with the dazzling brilliance of the sunlight. Have I seen it? Nothing so clearly. Science tells me that the light which I have seen is motion. I take my stand at the side of a mighty piece of ordnance—the 100-ton gun—while the shot is being fired, and my ears are, as it were, riven with the deafening report

which seemed to rip and rend the very atmosphere. Have I heard it? Nothing so plainly. Science tells me that the sound which I have heard is motion. I draw near to a heated furnace, and I put my hand into the flame until the pain is maddening. Have I felt it? Nothing so keenly. Science tells me that the heat which I felt is motion. Light, heat, sound, are but terms of motion, and these are the most palpably evident things in Nature.

So far, we are still in the outer and lower court of the world's wonders. The crowning phenomenon of the whole universe is Thought in the mind of man. As a marvel and mystery of power, both in the inscrutable subtlety of its process and in the far-reaching sweep of its operation and results, there is nothing in all the rest of the universe which can be compared to it. The wonders of the world outside of us are not nearly so great as the wonder which is inside of us. The works of Nature in the stars above us, and in the earth beneath us, and in the air around us, are immeasurably surpassed and transcended by the work which is wrought within the mind of every man whenever he uses his intelligence to think, or to know, or understand. But this use of the faculty means motion—not indeed in the sense of local motion, but motion really and

essentially in the sense of the exercise of a function, and the movement of powers into activity. From the farthest planet to the inmost recesses of our being, motion is everywhere.

What has our reason to say when it reads the open page of Nature, and beholds the universe vibrating and pulsating from end to end and from age to age with this ubiquitous law of motion?

It says with all possible plainness that where all is in motion, there must be a Prime-mover. That Prime-mover is what we call God.

The more we think of it the more we shall realise the necessity of the Prime-mover. And the more we shall feel that the absence of one is unthinkable.¹

We can see that motion by its very essence must mean a procession or transition. It is not merely dynamic. It may be from place to place, or it may be from one state or condition to another. But it is from somewhere to somewhere, or from something to something. It is this which is the very condition of all progress and evolution. Nothing can ever move without

¹ That the Prime-mover must itself be unmoved, is obvious. If it were moved, it would postulate another being to move it, and it would not be the Prime-mover. An endless succession of movers and moved is unthinkable as existing in reality.

moving in some direction. We may think of that direction as a line, or we may think of it as a succession of states. When we turn to find its beginning, mentally, the line or succession might be extended indefinitely backwards. But in the real world there is no such thing as indefinite or illimitable extension. Nothing can ever escape the law of its constitution; and even as the part has its measure, so the whole must have its measure, however great it may be and beyond our reckoning. Hence the line must have an initial point, however far back we must go to find it. And the evolution must have a primary stage, however remote in the world's history that stage may be. In other words, there must have been a point at which, or a source from which, the world-motion was started, and there must therefore have been a Prime-mover to impart the movement and to conduct its evolution.

This power which is behind all nature is God. As Prime-mover, He is the source by which all the manifold movement of nature is fed and sustained—and, as the Unmoved, He is the Constant which gives reason to all change, and the Eternal which gives reason to all time and succession. It is in Him that “we live, and move, and have our being.”

II.—*Argument from Causality.*

A second proof is found in the nature of Causation.

In the universe we have a vast multitude of phenomena. It is quite clear that these are not isolated from, or independent of, one another. On the contrary, they are so connected that one brings about another, or makes it to be. This connection is called causation, and the thing which makes something else to be is called a cause, and the thing which is made to be is called an effect. If we ask why should things

be thus connected, the answer is that they are so because there exists an underlying unity in the phenomena.

**Unity of
Nature the
Basis of
Causality**

Just as in mathematics or geometry, the explanation why one truth should be the reason of another truth is to be found in the intrinsic unity of all truth, so the explanation why one thing in this world should cause another to be, is a certain unity which binds together all nature. Effects flow from causes, and conclusions flow from principles or premisses, because each has unity as a basis to go upon. We may also note that there is not only unity, but—as we have seen in the motion proof—there is direction. Effects are found to proceed from causes, or con-

clusions from premisses, but not inversely; the causes do not come out of the effects, nor do the premisses come out of the conclusion. That means that in the unity there is *order* or procession, whether in things logical or ontological. Moreover, this order or procession is real; that is to say, it is due not merely to our minds or to any mental categories, but it exists in the nature of truth, and is the nature of the universe. A given degree of heat causes a rock to melt. Here is cause and effect, and with them there is also a fixed order or direction. It is the heat which causes the melting, and not the melting which causes the heat. Both the connection and the order or direction are real. The heat would have melted the rocks—in point of fact, it did so—even if no man were on the face of the earth to witness it, or no human mind were there to know it. Hence the relation between the heat and the melting could not be adequately expressed as mere *sequence*. For sequence would only mean that the one followed the other, and one might argue that the following was merely a matter of *then* and *after*, or a matter of time, and consequently something subjective or depending on the standpoint of the observer. The relation, based as it is on the real unity of nature, is obviously

Sequence
an
Inadequate
Explanation

real ; and the one really and naturally not only precedes the other, but brings about the other, and would do so if no human mind had ever existed. We may see this more clearly in a rather crude example. An express train has passed me at full speed, and I ask myself why do the carriages move along the line. Evidently the movement of the carriages is due to the movement of the locomotive, which in turn is due to the pressure of the steam, and so on, till we might pass along a line of ulterior causes. But if anyone told me that the explanation was to be found in sequence, it is clear that his explanation would not explain. For sequence means "following" ; and to tell me that the carriages moved along the line because they followed the engine, or because the moving of the engine first takes place, and the movement of the carriages afterwards, is to tell me nothing, seeing that it is *why* they move or followed the engine is just what I want to know. If, on the other hand, my attention is drawn to the couplings, and I am shown that the cohesion is such that the movement of the engine causes a conveyance of energy and the movement of the carriages, I am at once put upon the true line of the solution. But the couplings and cohesion are real, and not subjective, and the relation between the movement of the engine and

that of the carriages is effective ; or in other words, it is not mere sequence, but causation based upon an actual transference of energy or force.

It is exactly this real connection of phenomena which forms the foundation of all scientific knowledge and achievement. True Science is essentially the knowledge of things through their causes. Any one standing by a water-mill may observe the fact that the wheel turns round, and the fact that the water falls upon the wheel, and the fact that the water flows through the mill-race. Even a brute might see or observe such facts. But the man, and especially the man of science, by the law of his reason goes farther, and asks the reason why. He sees the cause of the rotation of the wheel in the weight-pressure of the flowing and falling water, and the cause of the flow and fall of the water in the law of gravity, and its liquid nature, and he will pursue his research of causes if need be into its chemical composition. But throughout he is building on the principle of causation and the real connection of cause and effect, and every induction which he makes from his observed facts assumes the unity or uniformity of nature by which the same causes in the same circumstances will produce the same effects. We may note that the mere unity of nature in itself is not

Direction
as well as
Unity

enough for his purpose. He must count upon a certain fixed order or direction existing in the phenomena, by which some produce others and are not produced by them. Without this principle of real connection and direction which we call causation, the whole work of science would come to a standstill, and all its achievements in the past would be reduced to guess-work. If causation be the explanatory principle of Nature, it must also be the effective principle of Nature; for the way in which things are known must ever at root be the way in which things themselves are made or done. The mind understands a thing in its cause because in the cause it, so to speak, witnesses the doing or the making of it. The logical and the ontological are but two ways of walking the same road, although the doing begins from one end and the knowing begins from the other, as the cause acts downwards to effect, while the mind investigates upwards from the effect to the cause. This very connection of phenomena which we have termed direction—the procession of effect from cause—is in itself a finger-post embedded in the very nature of things, pointing back to the source from which all things have proceeded. And here we reach the gist of our argument.

If the universe lies before us as a vast multitude of phenomena—if this multitude be not a

chaos, but a world held together by a marvellous law of unity, and at the same time marked by a not less marvellous law of direction or procession, as seen in the uniform but manifold concatenation of causes and effects (the origin no doubt of variety);—if we have as a result all that splendour of order which means classification in place and evolution in time, then at the root of all this unity and causation there must be One Cause, in which the unity finds its source, and from which the causation derives its original impulse and energy. That is only to say that when we have in the universe a vast chain of causes and effects, and when we travel up from cause to cause, and then again to an ulterior cause, the series existing as it does in reality cannot be indefinite, and we must eventually reach the First Cause, which is God. In doing so our minds are only logically or by knowledge travelling up the chain by which the Final Cause ontologically or by creation, so to speak, worked down. However long the chain, there must be an initial link, and above all there must be a Linker; or the chain had never been woven, nor its links put together in the admirable order in which we find them.

We have seen that the connection between phenomena is effective. It is not merely that one succeeds the other, but the one brings about the

other. That means that there must be a transference of energy, or a transformation, or at least a transition of energy, in the succession. Something must pass from one to another or from one in the other, or there would be no *trans* in the matter. Hence causation is necessarily a giving, and a cause is essentially a giver; and an effect is what is, and has what it has, just because it has received it from the cause. The molten rock equals all that caused the composition of the rock plus the heat which melted it. Hence the old scholastic axiom, which says that there is nothing in an effect which first of all did not exist (and in a higher manner) in its cause. That is only another way of saying that no one can give what it has not. If, then, the principle of causation teaches us that there is a First Cause from which proceeded all the effects which we see in the universe, and which is simply a series of givings, it teaches us also that there can be found in the universe nothing of being, viz., nothing real or good, which is not to be found first of all and most of all in the First Cause from which all originated. Hence if we find here amongst us such things as goodness, life, love, intelligence, the First Cause must be one which has all these attributes, and in the highest way, and is there-

Causation
is giving

fore not only God, but a good, living, loving, intelligent, and therefore a Personal God. If our seeing, hearing, and understanding have come from Him, He must be one who Himself can see, hear, and understand.¹ That is an argument which appealed to man long before the Scholastics. "*He that planteth the ear, shall He not hear ; and He that formed the eye, doth He not consider ? He that chastiseth the nations, shall He not rebuke ; He that teacheth men knowledge ?*" (Ps. xciii.).

III.—*Argument from Necessity.*

Another proof is found in the nature of the world's existence. We feel there is wide difference between the ways in which things are felt to

¹ It would be superficial to discount the force of such an argument on the plea of its being anthropomorphism. As long as being comes down from cause to effect, it must be reasonable and logical to argue upwards from effect to cause, and to attribute *eminenter* to the cause whatever there is of the nature of being in the effect. That is only to assert the unity of Nature and the necessary harmony of the logical with the ontological, or knowledge with the nature of things. There is therefore so far a true anthropomorphism which attributes to God all, in the highest way, which is good in man. Anthropomorphism becomes false only when it departs from this law, and attributes to God not being, or what is good and positive, but the limitations, the falling short, or negation of being, which is evil or imperfection as found in man.

be true. For instance, it is true that two and two make four, and that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles. These statements are so true, that we know and feel that they never could have been otherwise. They are eternally and immutably and universally true, and a time, place, or condition in which they would not be true is utterly unthinkable. Because they are not only true, but *must* be true, they are called *necessary* truths. But there are other statements which as a matter of fact are true, but which we feel might have happened to be otherwise. For instance, it is true that you are reading this page at the present moment ; but it might have easily happened that this page had never been written, or that you had never consented to read it. It is true that London is built on the Thames ; but it is true not necessarily, but just because, as a fact, it happens to be so ; because London might have been built elsewhere, or might never have been built at all. When things are true, not because they must be so, and cannot be otherwise, but because as a matter of fact they happen to be true, they are called happenings, or *contingent* truths. The distinction is a very plain one, and one which comes home to the common sense of every reasoning mind. We are all familiar with it, when we

Necessary
and
Contingent
Truth

draw the distinction between principles and facts.

We apply it to the world around us, and ask ourselves to which class of truths does the universe belong? Clearly, it belongs to the happening or contingent class. No one feels for a moment that the statement that the universe exists, is on a par with the statement that two and two make four. The first is quite true, but it might have been otherwise. The second is necessary, and anything else would be impossible. Or, if we wish to push the inquiry farther, we may once more call to mind that law by which nothing can ever rise above its own composition and constitution. Every part, and every group of parts of the universe which we see is manifestly contingent. There is nothing in physical nature which might not have been, and the laws of Nature although *de facto* determined, fixed, and uniform, are not immutable like mathematical truths, in the sense that it would be impossible or unthinkable that they should ever have been otherwise. If the parts of the universe be thus contingent, it is clear that the whole must be likewise contingent, for there can be nothing in a whole which is not derived from the parts which constitute it. But once we know that the universe is contingent, we are in face of two

alternatives. Either the universe was made by someone—or, the universe always existed of itself. Now if we examine the second, we find that it will not hold good. That a necessary being should exist of itself and from all time, is intelligible. But that a contingent being—as we have seen the universe must be—should so exist, is incredible. In the first place, a being which existed of itself could not help itself from existing (since, to prevent itself from existing, it would have to exist before it existed—which would be absurd). If it cannot help itself from existing, and there is nothing else to help it, it would be a necessary being, and not a contingent being, for its non-existence would be an impossibility. In the second place, if a universe existed from all time, and were still contingent, we should have to believe that its existence was really nothing more than a mere happening or accident. In that case we should either have to seek something outside¹ of the universe, which determined the happening in favour of existence rather than the reverse, or we should have to leave the happening without any determining cause at all, either in itself or elsewhere. But that would be literally to ascribe the existence of

¹ If its existence were determined from within, it would be self-existent and necessary.

the whole universe to chance. Such a conclusion would be all that is unreasonable and unscientific. Reason asks the why of all existence, and tells us that the determinant of existence must be either inside the being which exists—in which case it is self-existent and necessary, and not contingent—or it is outside of it, in which case it is contingent and not self-existent or necessary. But to believe in existence without a determinant either within or without would be to refer the maximum of being to no reason whatever, and to land ourselves in the lowest depth of superstition; for superstition exactly consists in ascribing effects to non-existent causes; and the greater the effect so ascribed, the greater the superstition. True Science asks the causes of things, and takes as its ruling principle that nothing happens by chance. If it be unscientific to refer even the least part of the universe to chance, how much more unscientific would it be to refer the whole?

Throughout this argument we have been relying upon a fact of rational experience, namely, the distinct apprehension of necessary as contrasted with contingent truth. The verdict of our reason is that the one is not the other, and that the one *must* be, and cannot but be, while the other only is or may be, and might not be. There is the whole class of mathematical and

geometrical truths belonging to the one and the whole class of physical and historical truths belonging to the other. If the distinction could be shown not to exist in the nature of things (based on the root-difference between identity of being and mere fact, viz., between essence and action), but to be due merely to mental category, or a groove of the mind which apprehends, and not to anything in the truths apprehended, the argument would indeed be subverted. But in that case we should have to face the consequences. One of the plainest facts of mental experience—the sense of a necessary truth as different from a contingent one—would have been proved to be illusory and misleading. Our reason, in telling us that a whole set of truths is of a kind which must be, would have utterly deceived us, and in telling us that their contradictions were impossible, would have equally misled us. Our perception of the principle of identity would have been a mental illusion. If this were the case, it is difficult to see how we could ever afterwards trust to the report of experience or to the dictate of reason. All physical science is built on experience, and all mathematical science on reason, and precisely on reason perceiving this very principle of identity.

Causation
not a
Mental
Category

If, then, the distinction which is the foundation of the argument were impugned, we could only feel that all modern science was based upon false and unreliable foundations.¹

I may sum up the statement of this argument by saying that our reason, by refusing to confuse the things which it feels must be with those which are but might not be, has a sense of *necessity*. It thus enables us by demarcation to perceive the quality of contingency, or non-aseity—in other words, of createdness—which attaches to the universe, whether in its constituent parts or in its constituted whole. As such a universe must have for its existence a determinant which

¹ We cannot explain away the sense of necessary truth by holding the theory that it is merely due to an inherited tendency to conclude that what we have always seen to be must always have been ;—in other words, that our remote ancestors found by experience, so much and so often, that two and two made four, that their descendants gradually lost the power of perceiving that it could be otherwise, and thus acquired an inherited sense of necessity. Man from the beginning has been face to face to nature, and with a multitude of physical facts which have entered quite as constantly into his experience. He saw the grass grow, and the rivers flow, and the sun rise and set morning and evening, and presumably before he had learned to count that two and two made four. Yet, after thousands of years in perceiving these physical facts, we are not conscious of any sense of necessity as we undoubtedly are in dealing with necessary truths,

is not of itself, there must exist outside¹ of it a Being self-existent and necessary upon which it depends. This Being we call God, "upholding all things by the word of His power." (Heb. i. 3).

IV.—*Argument from Perfection.*

Another argument for the existence of God is based on the varying degrees of perfection in which things are found to consist. The world is not only marvellously complex, but the things in it differ from one another by being some higher and better than others. A plant is higher than a stone, a brute is higher than a plant, and man is higher than the brute. Moreover, qualities of strength, beauty, worth, are possessed by some in a higher measure as by others in a

¹ We say "outside" of it in the sense of being immeasurably distinct from it. The distance between God and His creation is not spatial but ontological. A concept of God in His heaven or away above the stars, is simply a very natural way of representing the transcendentalism of the Necessary Being. It has its due correction in the doctrine of His omnipresence. Some who lay stress upon His immanence, represent Him as the "groundwork" upon which all phenomena are projected. But obviously the concept of God as a groundwork is, if anything, more crude than that of a God beyond the stars. And a spatial God would be even more unthinkable than a sidereal one,

lower, and things present themselves in a scale of innumerable degrees of perfection. Thus all over the face of nature is written conspicuously the distinction of higher and lower and more and less. But, as higher and lower and more or less are plainly relative, there must in the nature of things be somewhere a standard in relation to which they become higher or better as they approximate, and lower or less as they become remote. For a relative without an absolute is unthinkable. The standard might indeed *de facto* be something having the highest degree of perfection actually acquired. As such, it would be only contingently absolute; but the real absolute would require to be one outside of which there could be no higher degree of perfection possible, otherwise it itself would be relative and not absolute. Hence the more-or-less-ness which we see in nature is in its measure an indication of the absolute perfection which is but another name for God, of whom all relative perfection in nature is but the fragmentary shadow, measuring its greatness or goodness by its approach to Him.

We may here note that certain writers of the Positivist school have insisted very much on the relativity of all knowledge. They regard all phenomena as so many symbols rather than

realities ; and as the phenomena of the universe are innumerable and complex beyond all calculation, they argue that any conclusions or inductions founded upon any given set falling under our experience can never possess any absolute certainty, and can never be said to be true except in a sense which is not real but merely relative.

But if the contention were true, the real sufferers would not be the theists, but the scientists. It would mean that the whole work of science was based on unreality ; that its acquired results were after all not acquired, but liable to be annulled at any time by a change of the relativity ; and that men of scientific research were at best playing a game of counters, of which they themselves cannot even know the value. If that were the case, students of science might well have some reason for discouragement. On the other hand, the theist would feel that the more any one insisted that phenomena were mere symbols, and that the whole universe was a vast complexus of relativity, the more imperative would be the need of believing in an absolute. For relations do not hang in the air, and relativity without an absolute is inconceivable. The Absolute, which includes the reason of all reality, would be transcendental, and nothing

The Relativity of Phenomena

else than the God for whose existence the theist is contending ; and the more a Positivist insists on the relativity of knowledge and phenomena, the more, in fact, he is found to insist on the ultimate truth of God's existence.

V.—*Argument of Design.*

A well-known proof for the existence of God is found in the fact of all nature bearing the impress of design, and this proof when carefully considered is felt to be more profound than at first sight it might seem to be.

It is undeniable that in nature we find the twofold feature—symmetry and construction. In plants and in crystals are to be found geometrical forms of marvellous symmetry. But much more wonderful is the fact that in nature there is not only structure, but construction, viz., the adjustment of part to part with a view to the fulfilling of a given purpose. No machine which has issued from the inventive genius of man—the printing-press, the telegraph, the phonograph—can compare in mechanical adaptation to the solar system, or the organism of a plant or an insect. Man's machines are cumbrous at the best, as they are fitted together from the outside. Nature's machines are ex-

quisite, because they are fitted together from the inside and by the forces which permeate them. How far do such facts as symmetry or adaptation of parts imply the action of an intelligent cause? The mere fact of symmetrical forms in nature might be traced to the uniform action of certain forces. And even adaptation of part to part might within certain limits be explained by the tendency of matter to adapt Self-
Adaptation itself to the action of forces which shape it in the way best suited to the flow of their energy. If I see a round stick fitted exactly into a round hole in a hard substance, I may say that some intelligent artisan must have made the one to suit the other. But if a piece of wood were pressed by some continuous force against the round hole for a sufficiently long time, the mere pressure would make the stick to fit the hole, and we should have a case, not of design, but of force-adaptation. Why the matter of the wood suited the shaping pressure of the force, and why the wood and the force were there at all, working together, would still remain to be explained. If the result were not a mere round stick fitted to a round hole, but a wonderful and complex organism functioning by a co-ordination of manifold parts for a definite purpose, we should feel that the fact of mere

force-adaptation would not go very far to account for the construction. Force is one thing, but the purpose or purposive action which characterises force is another. It is the latter which is so plain in nature, and which cries out for an explanation. Herein is the ulterior strength of

<p>Example of Design— Argument</p>	<p>the Argument of Design. I see a heron wading in the shallows, fishing for its prey. As I watch it at its work, I may observe that it presents all the evidences of having been designed by an intelligent Creator. There is the long beak, so admirably fitted to reach down far into the water for the food it seeks; the supple neck, which allows it to deliver the stroke with unerring precision; the long legs, enabling it to wade far out into the water where its food may be found. I might conclude that surely an intelligent Creator had given it such a beak, neck, and legs, precisely with the design that it should be able to live and to find its sustenance. But here I may stand corrected. A naturalist may point out to me that the bird has a history, and that it was not</p>
<p>Evolutionist Explanation</p>	<p>always shaped as I now see it. He may proceed to tell me what he believes to be the tale of its evolution. It was once very much like other birds. To begin with, its material organism was more or less plastic,</p>

and likely to be shaped by internal and external conditions. Then energy flows more fully into a member the more it is used, and the member is thus developed in size and strength. The bird, obliged to use its legs in walking and wading after its prey, and its beak in seizing it, gradually strengthened these members rather than others. Moreover, it would, by the law of heredity, transmit these characteristics to its offspring. The farther it would have to wade out into the water for a supply of food, the better chance its long legs and strong beak would give it of finding what it wanted. Those of its offspring which had the longest legs and strongest beaks would have more plentiful food, and would be the more likely to survive, to be strong and vigorous, and to have numerous progeny. Those which had not these advantages would be handicapped in the struggle for existence, and would become weak, would die out, and fail to have offspring. Thus by the mere self-shaping process of energy moulding the organism from within, and environment moulding it from without, and weeding out the unfitted, we may come to have the heron very much as we now find it. All that is but a very crude outline of the working of a theory with which we all are familiar.

Let us, then, for the moment accept the theory, and examine the process. There is at the very beginning a law of nutrition or self-preservation, by which the animal seeks to sustain the life within it by the quest of food which is outside of it. That is law number one. Then there is the law of plasticity of organism, by which its members can be moulded more or less by inward forces or outward environment. That is law number two. There is the law of invigoration, which sends most of the vital energy into a member that is most used, and least into that which is least used, so that the one becomes strengthened and developed, while the other becomes weakened or atrophied. That is law number three. There is the law of heredity, which transmits to the offspring even in a pronounced degree the character thus given to the organism of the parents. That is law number four. There is the law of survival of the fittest, which enables those who are adapted to the food-finding and environment to live and thrive and multiply, and weeds out and cuts off the succession of those who are not. That is law number five. We have thus five laws, each with its own specific drift and operation ; laws which we may roughly name food-quest, member - moulding,

How the
Explanation
Enforces
the Original
Argument

energy-flow, heredity, and elimination of the weakest. And these five laws are not at all separate, isolated, or independent. On the contrary, they are adjusted so as to fit into one another, all moving together by a marvellous interadaptation and interaction to achieve one definite purpose—the production of a well-developed heron. Now that in itself—this mechanism of laws—is a combination far more wonderful, more eloquent in its need of a constructive intelligence, than any machine which has ever come under our observation. If I had under my hands a machine consisting of five main parts, which when put together worked harmoniously to effect a given object, I might admire indeed the skill of the inventor. But if I have before my eyes a construction in which it is no longer five dead parts, but five active laws of nature that are so deftly handled, interwoven, and combined, that by their interplay they are perpetually turning out a multitude of living types, with the ages for their working-day and the universe for their workshop, I may justly feel that here indeed is Design in the most telling and sublime sense of the word. Any mere adjustment of parts can never equal in ingenuity and skill that adjustment of laws which must

**Mechanism
of Parts
and
Mechanism
of Laws**

ever be a higher and subtler form of mechanism. If an ordinary machine requires an intelligent constructor to adapt its parts and fit them together, how much more this higher mechanism of laws cries out for the need of an intelligent Maker to set them in motion, to combine their action, to direct their operation to the definite purpose for which we see them so wonderfully working. The earthly mechanic plods with his material, which he shapes in such a way that the laws of nature may help him to achieve his object. The laws themselves are beyond his control, and he can only apply them. But the Mechanic who can handle the laws themselves and fit *them* to work together, even as the earthly mechanic fits his wheels and levers, must transcend in power and intelligence all human genius.

The argument of Design is not impaired, but rather strengthened and enhanced, by all that the naturalist can tell us of evolution. It means that the universe is a vast and complex mechanism, and that, not only for the marvellous adjustment of its parts, but above all, for the still more marvellous adjustment of its laws, it requires an Intelligent Adjuster.

Adjustment
and Pre-
conception

The need is one which we may see more clearly when we reflect on the connection that exists between con-

struction and preconception. For things have to exist mentally before they exist really, whenever they have to be put into any kind of order.

Let us suppose that we have before us a mechanism of a given number of pieces. It is clear that we have not merely these pieces, but a special quality attaching to each, by which they fit into one another in order to work for a definite object. It is equally clear that the pieces have received this quality, their special make and shape, in view of the object to be attained. That implies that they must have been seen and adjusted before they were actually made, else there is no guiding principle on which the adjustment could have been directed. The only medium in which things can be seen or shaped before they come into real existence, is an intelligent mind. It alone can foresee the object and mentally picture the pieces and their adjustment, and thus give to them the shape which is required for the purpose in view.

If it were otherwise, we should have to suppose that the pieces shaped themselves by some blind and unconscious tendency inherent in themselves; and what is stranger still, that while the tendency was thus blind and unconscious, and able neither to see nor know what it was aiming at, it achieved its purpose with unerring precision

and unrivalled success. Such a reason would be worse than none. We feel that such a belief would be degrading, for it attributes all that is highest and best in the universe to a cause which is blind and ignorant.¹ It would be futile to veil the real meaning of the belief by using such terms as "Nature" or "Laws of Nature," as if these were personifications. Nature in so far as it acts, means certain forces, and laws of nature mean nothing more than the uniform mode in which the forces act. While these forces are non-intelligent they can neither see, nor know, nor understand, and therefore no amount of rhetoric would ever conceal the poverty and hopeless inadequacy of the position by which a blind and ignorant force is made to stand as the reason of the construction of plants and of planets, and of achievements in ingenuity and contriving skill immeasurably transcending all the wisdom and most brilliant genius of mankind. To say that a magnificent mechanism like the universe had no other author than an unconscious force, is not to give to a reason, but rather in despite of all reason, to impute wonders of foresight to that which sees

¹ To say that intelligence was latent in the original forces, and afterwards developed, would not in the least help in the solution. For it was not the developed intelligence as we see it in man that shaped the universe, and the intelligence in its latent forces could not see or understand.

not, and wonders of contrivance to that which knows not. To accept such a contradiction requires more credulity than most men are found to possess. As an explanation of the universe, it not only fails to explain, but gives us instead a genesis of the greater out of the less, and of things out of their contradictories, which is in itself something far more difficult than the original problem. As a creed, it seems to be in reality something harder to believe than any of the dogmas of revealed religion.

As we cannot accept this blindfolded know-nothing wonder-worker called Force as the contriver of the glorious mechanism of the universe, we conclude that just because it is a mechanism it must have had an intelligent Maker. For construction and adjustment of parts by their nature imply preconception in a thinking mind, and preconception implies intelligence.

To construct something is something more than to know something. If it is certain that it requires intelligence, and a high degree of it, to know the solar system, or the organism of a plant or an insect, much more must intelligence have been needed to produce it and to give knowledge so much to work upon. What mind alone can study, mind alone can have

constructed to be studied. Men of science, astronomers and physicists, by the very measure of their genius, which we gratefully admire, are themselves the best refutation of the conclusions of some amongst their number, who ascribe the existence of the world to a cause immeasurably less intelligent than themselves. Hence we have to choose between belief in an Intelligent Creator—the most simple and rational solution, and the one most in harmony with the workings of our own intelligent nature—or to descend to the bathos of putting at the origin and in supreme control of all things a force which can neither see, nor hear, or understand—an alternative which, as we have said, seems to us the apotheosis of blindness and ignorance. That which is at the beginning of all things, and which contains the reason of all things, is God, by whatever name we may choose to call it. If we are to have a God—and by the force of the definition we must have one—it is neither good nor reasonable, nor in keeping with our nature or with His handiwork, that we should have a blind one.

VI.—*Argument from Law or Conscience.*

The argument which is sought in the nature of Law, in the deeper sense of the word, may be

stated as follows. Our reason tells us that certain things are true or false. Our conscience—which is our reason in a certain aspect—tells us that certain things are right or wrong. Moreover we feel that this distinction is not arbitrary or conventional, but is rooted in the nature of things, and is therefore a law in the fundamental sense of the term. We know, for instance, not only that it is true that two and two make four, but that it is true in all times, in all conditions, and in all places, just as the statement that two and two make five would be false in the same manner. There is thus a law of truth as against falsehood, which is universal and everlasting. It is likewise immutable, and absolutely independent of man's consent. If all the nations of the world agreed to-morrow in a resolution by unanimous consent that in future two and two should make five, or anything else than four, we know that two and two would continue to make four just as it did from all time, and as it will do for all eternity. In like manner, there is a law of right as against wrong, which in its ultimate principle is immutable, eternal, and independent of human consent. An ethical flaw, like a mathematical one, is a violation of a principle which is in the nature of things above and beyond all human control or adaptation. If, then, there is thus written in our rational nature

a law of Truth and Falsehood, and a law of Right and Wrong—laws which are not of our making—there must be a Lawgiver who made them, and the Lawgiver must be like His law, necessary, eternal, and immutable. For law, above all things—even in its political sense, but much more in its natural sense—is the highest expression of order and purpose, and therefore of intelligence. There can be no law without a Lawgiver, and the Lawgiver must Himself be intelligent, if His law appeals to our intelligence.

It is sometimes said that our conscience is the revealer of God, and that it is God's voice within us. That is true in the sense that conscience is the name which we give to our reason when applied to matters of right and wrong (for conscience is not a distinct faculty from the intellect, and all its perceptions, in so far as it perceives at all, cannot be other than intellectual), and in so far as it is the voice of our reasonable nature which God has given us, it is the voice of God. But it is strictly the revealer, not directly of God, but of the "ought," or the duties which we owe to God. Naturally there would be no "ought" or duty at all, unless there was a righteous-

**The Law
and the
Lawgiver**

**The Dictate
of
Conscience
not a
Revealer
but a
Resultant of
Perception
of God's
Existence**

ness or God at the end of it. But the perception of righteousness—or of God, who is concrete righteousness—is the work of reason; and when reason sees it, and, consequently, the practical “ought” or “ought not” which arises therefrom, we call it conscience. God or righteousness in some shape has first of all to be reached by reason before reason, which we call conscience, can dictate its practical judgement. Conscience thus postulates God or goodness rather than reveals them. Hence the revealer of God in the natural order is the light of reason, as the Vatican Council most opportunely declared. Reason may apprehend the existence of God in two ways—either by looking back to Him as the First Cause, or looking forward to Him as the Last End. The one tells us that we were made *by* Him, the other tells that us we were made *for* Him. It is out of this second or final perception—viz., that we are made for goodness, or for God as our End—that comes the judgement of reason of what is or is not in harmony with our reaching it—God’s pleasure or displeasure as we call it—and the sense of sin or justice with the practical “ought” or dictate which we name conscience.

The distinction has its importance in the fact that the practical judgement of conscience takes

its direction from a speculative judgement of reason which precedes it. And because reason, while infallible in its first principles, is not so in its deductions, we have the case of what is known as false conscience. A man may be heard to say that he cannot conscientiously believe in transubstantiation. But it is not in the least his conscience which judges of the doctrine. His conscience cannot tell him whether transubstantiation is true, any more than it can tell him whether Free Trade or Protection is the better policy. He exercises on that matter his individual reason—his private judgement—to see whether it is true or not, and his reason in formulating conclusions has to depend on the apprehension of facts, which may or may not be adequate, and as a result he may or may not arrive at an accurate decision. Having arrived at the conclusion that transubstantiation is not true, his conscience proceeds to make its practical dictate, namely, that he ought not to believe or profess a doctrine which he judges to be untrue. This latter part is alone the voice of conscience, and that voice remains always true and must always be followed. But the conclusion to which he applies it, namely, that the doctrine of transubstantiation is untrue, is not at all the voice of conscience, but that of his own fallible

private judgement. The sense of right and wrong—of the duty of doing what God wills, or what is Godward or right, and of avoiding what God forbids, or what is ungodward or wrong, is not so much the cause as the resultant, and not so much the premiss as the conclusion of the reason perceiving that God is, and that certain actions make for or make against Him. The light of reason, in its true domain and in its primary principles, whether turned backward to God as our First Beginning in the revelation of our origin, or forward to God as our Last End in the revelation of our duty, remains the true Schekinah of the presence of God—the Alpha and Omega within us.

VII.—*Ontological Argument.*

The ontological proofs for the existence of God are generally felt to be somewhat abstruse and profound, but by the minds to which they appeal—Hegel's amongst others—they have been found in the long-run to be the most convincing and the most satisfactory. The one which I indicate here is not the well-known argument of St Anselm, but rather a line of thought which may serve at least to make more clear the unity and necessity of transcendental being, and of

the logical connection which exists between the concept of being and the attributes of God.

We have already seen in dealing with the proof which is drawn from perfection, that our reason recognises a clear distinction between necessary and contingent truths—for instance, between such a truth as two and two making four, and the truth that William of Normandy invaded this country. The one is and must be, and could not be otherwise. The other is and may be, but

might have been otherwise. With this
The Idea distinction before us, we turn our minds
of Being to what we feel to be the most funda-
 mental of all concepts—that of *being*. Because it is the bed-rock of thought, we cannot define it, and can only explain it by saying that Being is that which is. Its opposite is the Nothing or *nihilum*, that which is not.

If we reflect upon the meaning of these two terms, we shall feel that the Nothing or the *nihilum* could not exist. It would contradict itself if it did. A state of absolute nothingness is impossible. As it has been truly said, if nothingness had existed even for an instant, nothing could ever have existed afterwards. If, then, the nothing never could have existed, there must be something which always existed. And this something, whatever it may be, must always have

been, or else the nothing would have been, which is impossible. Hence there is a sense in which being is necessary; for to say that something *must* be, or cannot but have been, is to say in other words that it is a necessary being.

Here we have to guard against any mere play upon words. It might be said that what we have found by our reflection is the truth, that something or other must always have been, but not that the being itself is a necessary one; or, to put it otherwise, it is the truth that is necessary, not the being.

But if we reflect still further we shall find that after all the one implies the other.

For we know that since nothingness never could have been, something (we do not say what) always must have been in existence. If that something had the reason of its existence in itself—in other words, if it were self-existent—it would certainly be a necessary being, for by its very condition, its essence and existence would be the same, and it could not help existing. On the other hand, if the something which always existed had not the reason of its existence in itself, it must have had it in something else which had. Then this something else would be the self-existent and necessary being. Thus in any case, if the nothingness be excluded, as it must be, we can-

not escape from the admission of a necessary being.

Here it might be said that the necessary being which we have found is nothing more than being in general, or let us say, to put it concretely, the Universe.

Analysis of
Attributes

Whether that is so or not, we may try to find out by an analysis.

Let us call the being which we have been considering X. It includes simply that being which is necessitated by the inevitable exclusion of the nothingness.

1. We have seen that X must be, or the nothingness would be, and therefore X is a necessary being.

2. But as the nothingness not only cannot be, but never could have been, and never can be, it is clear that X not only must be, but must always have been, and must always be. X therefore is a being which has no beginning, and no end—which ever was, is, and ever shall be. In other words, it is eternal.

3. As the very meaning of X is that it is being which is logically forced upon us by the fact that nothingness could not exist, and as it is thus logically born by the exclusion of nothingness, it follows that it must contain all that is outside of nothingness, and that nothingness is

the only limit of its being. That is only to say that it contains the fulness of being, that its being is limitless, or Infinite. Since outside of it nothing can ever be, it contains the "all that is or ever can be," which is exactly the definition of the Infinite being.

4. As X is infinite, it is evidently one. By its very meaning, outside of it is nothingness, and therefore no other necessary being but it can exist. It has that outside oneness which means no other than one, or extrinsic unity.

5. As X is infinite, it is also simple or devoid of parts; that is, it has also inside oneness, or intrinsic unity. If X were composite, and so had parts, the parts would by the very fact have a number, and that number, at least in thought, could be added to. A greater than X could therefore be conceived and therefore possible, and X would not be infinite, and it would not be, as we have seen, the being "outside of which nothing can be." X is, therefore, simple by the fact of being infinite.

6. We have already seen that X is eternal; that as a being which must be, it must always have been, is, and must always be. Its duration is Infinite or eternal. There is no conceivable instant in which it was not (or in that time the nothingness would have been). But infinite or

eternal duration has no parts. If it had any such parts, their number could be added to, and it could be conceived as greater than it is. Hence X's existence is not one of successive time, but of eternity. As a necessary and eternal being it has not to wait until to-morrow for a part of its existence. Its being is the eternal now, without instants of succession in the past or future. Hence X is immutable, for change implies time, or succession of states or instants, since not even a Necessary and Infinite being can be and not be something at the same time.

Thus, from the concept of being, and by the contrast and inevitable exclusion of nothingness or the *nihilum*, there seems to be reasonably evolved before our minds a Being which is necessary, or self-existent, Eternal, Infinite, One Simple and Immutable. That Being certainly cannot be the universe around us, which has time, and change, and composition, and finiteness written so plainly all over its constitution. It is all that the universe is not, and the universe is all that it is not. And we may note that if anything were wanted to emphasise the abyssmal difference between them, and to prove that the universe cannot be the self-existent being which our reason demands, it would surely be

the doctrine of evolution. By its very concept, evolution postulates and insists upon limitation, number, succession, change; all of which are loud-voiced in declaring that the universe which they stamp cannot be the one which is Infinite, One Simple, Immutable, and Eternal, as the Being which is necessary must be.

It may be urged that in following this line of thought we merely allow ourselves to become the sport of our own dialectics, and that at the outset we have begged our conclusions in the formulation of our definitions, and that when we started with a being, which is logically alone with the *nihilum*, we practically secured all that we wanted, and the rest of the process has been mere thought-spinning and word-juggling, without adding any fresh truth to our original postulate.

But after all, we may feel it is not a very great logical sin to have at the end of our reasoning nothing in our conclusions which was not contained in, and did not come out of, our original premisses. Were it otherwise, we might have some cause for misgiving. And as to the premisses, or definitions of being and nothingness, if they can be called definitions, it would be futile to imagine that they can be treated as arbitrary assumptions, since they are concepts which lie at the root of all reality, and appeal as such to the

common sense of mankind. They are not certainly of our making, but are founded in the nature of things.

A more serious objection, albeit one which is never likely to have much grip on men of vigorous common sense, is that all such reasoning may hold good in the realm of mind, but there is no bridge between the ideal and the real, and therefore no means of being certain that any reality corresponds to our reasoning.

The plain answer to this contention, and to the systems of philosophy which lie behind it, must ever be that if knowledge is to be knowledge at all it must be knowledge by means of our minds, and

The
necessary
Postulate of
all Know-
ledge

that the first postulate of all knowledge must be that our minds are valid and veracious instruments for reaching the realities that lie outside of us. If they are not, we close the only door to know-

ledge of any kind, for we have no other instruments with which we can work, and if they are unreliable, their report as to our thoughts, quite as much as to things outside of us, would not be worth consideration. No man can jump out of his subjectivity in order to verify his impressions as to exterior realities, nor would it in the least serve his purpose even if he could, seeing that he would have left behind him his

mental apparatus, by which alone he could carry out the verification. Any system of epistemology which enters on a critique not merely of the mental process, but of the mental instrument itself, must be self-refuted, since it uses the very instrument which it criticises in order to make the criticism, and it is not easy to see how the criticism can ever be more trustworthy than the instrument which the critic has used to make it.

But in truth, as our minds are the only instruments by which we can know realities, whether inside or outside of us, we must be content to postulate their validity, or to know nothing, and condemn ourselves to a state of scepticism and ignorance. Men of common sense refuse to blow out the light and sit in the dark just because there is no absolute proof of the veracity of their eyesight.

To those that have once reached the truth of the Necessary Being, there is no need to say that in It they have found the bridge between their minds and exterior realities.

Our minds are by their very nature active images of the Divine mind.

That is why they are intelligent. Things outside of us are also by their very nature passive images of the Divine Reality. That is why they are intelligible. The minds that think and the things

The bridge
between the
Real and
Ideal

that are thought about are both analogues of the Divine Absolute, and things which are analogical to the same thing are analogical to one another. Thus between minds and objects there is an analogical bond which is necessary and ontological, and as such sure and veracious, and this is the bridge which He who is at once the Divine Ideality and Reality has built between the two.

It is precisely this bond or bridge which in a special way enforces the argument of Design. There is no mechanism—not even that of the solar system—which can be compared to that of the human mind as an instrument of thought. In an ordinary machine we admire the adjustment of part to part. Higher still is that marvellous adaptation in nature by which law is adjusted to law. But highest of all and most marvellous of all in the mechanism of the Universe is that ineffable adaptation which has been wrought between the minds that are ever thinking and their objects that are ever thought upon—between the mentalities and the realities—between the intelligences and the intelligibilities—between thoughts and things—so that as often as we observe, things are projected into thought, and as often as we construct, thoughts are projected into things, and the two worlds of mind and matter are forever clasped and interwoven in the union of the

Knowing and the Known. It is this adjustment of thoughts and things which is the design *par excellence*, and more eloquently than all others it demands the need of an Adjuster, and one who in Himself is Mind and Reality, and of whom all Intelligence and Intelligibility wedded here below are but the reflect and the likeness. It is in His absolute and transcendental Unity, containing the reason of all things—and not in our poor fragmentary universe of things here below—that we find the term of the true Monism with which our unity-loving souls crave to finish up the synthesis of all that we are and all that we know. He is the Eternal Monos. “*I am the First, and I am the Last, and besides Me there is no God*” (Isaias xliv. 6).

VIII.—*Æsthetic Argument.*

One of the most palpable facts of human experience is that there are things which are beautiful, and that it gives joy to behold them. It may be a majestic landscape, or a masterpiece of painting or sculpture or of musical composition, but we feel that in such things there is beauty, and that it elevates us, and gladdens us, and draws our souls towards it. Let us ask the reason why. If we analyse the

idea of beauty, it is evident that it is the combination of two things—Unity and Variety. If for variety, we were to say wealth of being, or wealth of formal entity, we should express our meaning more fully and more precisely. The most beautiful being is that in which the greatest variety, viz., the greatest amount of being (not mere quantitative but qualitative or formal being) is held together or co-ordinated in the closest degree of unity. Here we can see at once why beautiful things give joy. If an amount of being were altogether devoid of unity, it would be chaos, and beyond the reach of our minds. It would be intangible or unintelligible. It is just by the unity which is in a thing that it is mentally get-at-able. The mind itself is an active unity—active with the highest kind of activity which is life, and the highest kind of life, which is intelligence. Intelligence is living unity with the power of reading unity, and all things by their unity. We try to express all that by the single word *spirit*. Because it is living unity it has a mysterious way of getting into things by means of *their* unity, and by a vital act seeing them in itself, and that is the process which we call knowing or understanding. It follows that the more unity there is in a thing, the more clearly and readily the mind understands it. It is by

unifications, or general ideas—grasps of unity—that we gain our knowledge, sometimes chaining the unities as when we syllogise, or at other times simply contemplating their oneness by an act of intuition. In like manner, when an object which is beautiful comes before us, we apprehend it and get it into our souls by means of its unity, and the greater the measure of its unity, the clearer will be the apprehension. The greater the variety or wealth of being which is brought under the unity, the greater will be the soul-grasp, and consequently the greater the joy of the soul. For the two things which the soul loves and feeds upon are Unity and Being—or I ought rather to say, Being through Unity. It itself is Spirit or Unity-Being, and it delights in finding that which is the likeness of itself. It is, so to speak, a glimpse of its own beauty. The more intense the unity, and the more there is of variety, or muchness of being, the greater its delight becomes. Hence beauty gives joy owing to its very kinship to the soul. The unity, or self-compatibility which is inherent in things by which we understand them, or by which they are thinkable, is their “thinkable quality,” or *species intelligibilis*, and it is by it that we grasp or enter into them and feel all the joy of the beautiful and the true.

There is thus a very close connection between intelligence and the appreciation of the beautiful. If I place a beautiful masterpiece of some great painter before a dog, little notice will be paid to it. If I place it before a savage, endowed with an intelligence, lacking in cultivation perhaps, but therefore radically differing from the brute, the painting may be admired, but possibly not so much as the gilt frame. The æsthetic power to admire is there, but it may not be evoked by the painting in question. If I put it before a person who is not indeed a savage, but is ignorant or uncultivated, he may find pleasure in the work of art, but possibly not so much as in some brightly coloured print which would appeal more to unformed taste. If I put it before some one of high intelligence and artistic culture, the beauty of the painting will be felt and appreciated. Thus the conception of beauty, once found in human intelligence, is seen to transcend the sensible apprehension of the mere brute, and at the same time to be more recognised and relished the higher we ascend in the scale of cultured and refined mind. If upon a desert island I pick up a scrap of paper upon which a few words are written, I know that some intelligent being must have been the writer. Why? Because, if it is only by intelligence that I can read the words,

much more must it be only by intelligence that the words can have been written for me to read them. The writing, in fact, is the appeal which one intelligence makes to another. If, then, beauty is stamped so clearly, so widely, so magnificently upon the universe, and if it speaks so intensely to the depths of the human soul, it is evident that even as intelligence is needed to appreciate it, so intelligence must have been needed to put it there to be appreciated. In other words, if beauty be a handwriting upon the open page of the universe, which only intelligence can read, it must also be one which only intelligence can have written. All beauty is the appeal to our intelligence from the Supreme Intelligence—the Infinite whose oneness is the source of all unity, whether thinking or thinkable, and whose fulness of being is the source of all wealth of variety. It is the shadow of the Infinite beauty cast upon creation, and the only reason why one thing is more beautiful than another is because it has more of the joy-giving likeness of God.

In the foregoing arguments I have attempted to sketch, at least in bald outline, some of the reasons which help to convince us of the existence of God. But happily, God, like light, is His own revealer, and He, both by the light of

reason and the light of His own life, which we call grace, writes His witness vitally in the soul of man. That testimony, just because it is vital, is more than can be put into words, or formulated in the set terms of an argument. Also, because it is vital, and supernaturally vital, it will require not mere intellectual capacity, but qualities of heart which are in harmony with God, to receive it. No doubt, men will always feel about their Maker more than they can easily utter, but as in the case of the crystal and the sunlight, it is inevitable that how much or how little they may feel will depend upon the state of the soul, and its spiritual eyesight or power to assimilate the light will be in the measure of its moral nearness to the light and to the Light-giver.

In the trend of modern thought much value is rightly attached to the evidential value of experience. It is upon experience that modern science takes its stand, and carries from triumph to triumph the magnificent work which it accomplishes for the well-being of mankind. But physical experience is naturally limited to physical phenomena, and modern science does its work wearing spectacles, which by their very nature cannot carry beyond secondary causes. To all the experience of sense-perception, the

First Cause must remain invisible and inaccessible. God cannot be caught in the tests of the laboratory any more than He can be formulated on the blackboard. And that not because He is not, but precisely because He is, and is what He is and must be. A God that could be so detected by sense, or compressed into a finite formula, would be within measurable distance of us, and upon the upper end of the same intellectual plane as ourselves—He would certainly not be the First Cause, would not be the Necessary Being, would not be transcendental—all of which are but so many ways of saying that He would not be God at all. When, therefore, certain men of science tell us that in all their chemical or biological researches they have failed to find the faintest trace of a Supreme Being, we can only say that no one in possession of their senses ever imagined that they would or could, and that their testimony can only be welcome to us as their contribution, helping us in their way, to prove the transcendentalism, or what Scripture calls the invisibility of the King of the Ages—a quality which we feel to be one of the most necessary in the elements which enter into the concept of God.

Life, however, is broader than the laboratory or the blackboard, and it would be surely a poor

and narrow view of experience to limit it to one or the other. We have all in our own hearts a higher and wider theatre of experience. We have there, written in the life-record, all that we have felt of God working within us, of all God's dealing with us, of all that God has done for us in the great crises of our life, in hours of trial, temptation, sorrow, or of happiness, in the shade and shine of the years through which we have passed. We feel, more profoundly than words could utter, all that He has been to us, and all that we have been to Him. If experience be the best foundation of our knowledge, such life-experience written in the depths of our souls is to us the highest form of experience, and certainly one more telling, more intimate, and more secure than any which is likely to be found within the walls of the laboratory. If it were but the experience of a single soul, its evidence to that soul would be all-sufficient. But what we feel is felt not less intensely by millions of human hearts around us ; has been felt by millions from generation to generation in the inner—and what, after all, is the more real—history of mankind. With this volume of testimony, soul-deep and world-wide, within us and around us, we can rest secure in the consciousness of our God, and read in Him the glad meaning of our lives here,

and the glorious meaning of our lives hereafter, when the eyes, from which have been wiped away all earthly tears, shall “*see the good things of the Lord in the land of the living*” (Ps. xxvi. 13).

APPENDIX

WORKS ON THEISM THAT MAY BE CONSULTED

St Thomas Aquinas.—*Summa Theologiæ.*

Summa Contra Gentiles.

Bernard Bædder.—*Theologia Rationalis.*

Stonyhurst Manuals.—*Natural Theology.*

First Principles.

L. von Hammerstein.—*Foundations of Faith.*

R. Clarke.—*Dialogue on the Existence of God.*

S. Reinstadler.—*Elementa Philosophiæ Scholasticæ.*

Benedict Lorenzelli.—*Philosophiæ Theoreticæ Institutiones.*

Cardinal Manning.—*Religio Viatoris.*

Professor Flint.—*Theism ; Anti-Theistic Theories.*

Professor Caldecott.—*The Philosophy of Religion.*

Rev. C. Harris.—*Pro Fide.*

PRINTED BY
OLIVER AND BOYD
EDINBURGH

WESTMINSTER LECTURES

(THIRD SERIES)

EDITED BY REV. FRANCIS AVELING, D.D.

MYSTICISM

BY THE

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LONDON AND EDINBURGH
SANDS & COMPANY

ST LOUIS, MO.

B. HERDER, 17 SOUTH BROADWAY

1907

PREFACE

IT is impossible, of course, within the limits of this lecture, even to mention by name many of that great body of Mystics who at various times have been lights in the Catholic Church. A sketch even of German Mysticism alone would occupy more space than is at my disposal. All that I have attempted to do is to indicate the relation of Mysticism to dogmatism, to show that the Church has always recognised them as correlatives rather than irreconcilables, and finally, to point out what seems to me a kind of ready reckoner, which may usefully be applied for the determination of a Mystic's position among his fellows.

I have added a few footnotes and references, but, purposely, very few, since these, for the most part, tend to confuse rather than to illuminate; and those extracts that I have selected are put forward as containing the

general point of which the passage treats rather than as inclusive of all that the author has said on the subject. No doubt they could be qualified to some extent by other passages from the same writer.

In the books recommended at the end, I have chosen biographies and works of the Mystics themselves, rather than commentaries upon them, in the hope that those who wish to pursue the subject will go straight to the original stream, rather than to reservoirs; but I have added one volume on the English mystics which may be read with profit, but it must be remembered that the author is not a Catholic.

MYSTICISM

OF all phases in religious thought that at the present day are attracting attention, none is more prominent than that of Mysticism. It is a subject that is engross-^{Many} "Mystics"
ing widely differing minds of every variety of creed, Christian and non-Christian; we hear of Mahatmas in London who profess to reveal The Way; we read lives of Catholic contemplatives written by Presbyterian ministers; there are numerous societies, Theosophical and Buddhistic, formed for this study; and among many there seems more and more a growing conviction that the road to the restoration of broken unity lies along these lines. Many of these groups indeed are contemptible; but many are not; the movement is associated with sincerity and a genuine desire to attain to truth, and the value of this fact is scarcely diminished by the folly of those

who lead the world to think that Mystics are no more than picturesque dreamers who wear long hair and talk nonsense, and that their system is one which, professing to transcend reason, only succeeds in contradicting it.

It seems suitable, then, that at such a time as this, something should be said of that strain of mystical thought which has always found a place in the Catholic Church, and of the great saints who represent it; for it must be remembered that while on the one side Mysticism has been caustically described as the "fog in which heresy conceals itself," on the other the Church has always recognised its value, and has raised to her altars those who have been eminent in its study and practice. It is remarkable, in fact, that that body which in the world's opinion stands for formalism and ceremonial should unfalteringly hold up the contemplative life as the highest known to man, and should, as her one exception, allow those of her children who have embraced the active life to forsake it, however solemn their vows, in exchange for that higher vocation of retirement and prayer in which, as even non-Catholics admit, the proper atmosphere of mystical thought is to

be found. Right down through the ages shines out this line of saints and sages, honoured above all by the Mother of Saints, —men and women who have produced no books, preached no sermons, and accomplished no external works, but whose explorations into the spiritual world, whose silent acts of purgation, illumination, and union have been accounted by Her who lives in both worlds as the highest achievements attained by human souls.

Purgation—
Illumination
—Union

Let us, then, consider this subject for a little in a few of its more elementary aspects; and first let us try to understand the place it occupies in the Divine economy of Truth.

I. As we look out at the world about us, we are bewildered by its complexity, and yet what each sees of it is only a very limited superficies. No two men take exactly the same view of what all agree is an objective and united whole. The stockbroker, the poet, the soldier, and the divine —each, as we say, lives in a world of his own. An incident takes place—a war, let us say, breaks out—an incident which, superficially

Complex
Views

considered, is a certain limited event, capable of chronicle, beginning and ending at certain moments. Yet we begin to perceive something of its complexity when we consider its effect upon various classes of people. The stock-broker buys and sells stock according to circumstances, the poet composes a martial and patriotic ode, the soldier joins his regiment, and the divine falls to prayer. The incident is one and the same, it arises from a certain cause, it involves the exchange of certain papers, it is, in one sense, a very simple thing, and yet its significance is almost infinitely various.

Or consider an even more simple object of thought—for example, a field in spring-time.

There is a fable of three men who stood looking at it, leaning on the same gate at the same time—a geologist, a farmer, and a poet. Each had eyes of equal capacity, each a brain of the same material, and each had the same object of contemplation; yet each was affected by what he saw, in a wholly different plane, and with wholly different results. The geologist saw the tilt of the strata and the hint of a fossil-bed, and went away to add an illustrative footnote to

The Point
of View

his great work ; the farmer, chewing a straw, detected the productive power of the soil, and that evening made a certain offer for the purchase of the five-acre ; the poet saw only the curve and colour of the grasses, composed a sonnet, and published it in the *Westminster Gazette*. Each looking upon the same thing, saw that only for which he looked, and yet none of them was the dupe of his fancy. Another geologist, another farmer, and another poet would have seen and said the same kind of things respectively as our three friends.

Yet, curiously enough, probably each of the three despised the point of view of his companions. The geologist sneered at the grossness of the farmer, and the subjective nonsense of the poet ; and the poet wondered how reasonable men could be so blind and insensate.

If we wish, then, to have a comprehensive knowledge of the field (or rather an approximation towards such knowledge), we must not range ourselves with any one of these three, but must consult them all. Not that these three are sufficient ; for each is only repre-

Compre-
hensive
Knowledge
of a thing
in all its
aspects

sentative of a class. There are schools of geologists, of farmers and of poets, each one of which, it may be, agrees only with his fellows as to the plane on which he observes and dogmatises. Among farmers there are those who uphold the use of chemical manures, and those who do not; among poets there are to be found both realists and idealists. This, then, enormously increases the complexity of knowledge. It is God only who can see a thing absolutely as it is in all its aspects and relations.

Now apart from such things as fields and wars, there is that aspect of the world which we call religion; there is that inner **Religion** spirit-world to which all religious instinct bears witness—a world which, in the opinion of all believers in the supernatural, interpenetrates and transcends the world of sense. The degree and manner in which it does so is a matter of opinion, varying with the religion held by the individual thinker. In conventional religion—in the view of those persons who regard their devotion merely as a small and unimportant parenthesis in their lives—it hardly does so at all; there are certain moments when homage must be paid

to the Divine Ruler, certain ceremonial actions to be performed, but, beyond that, the world is to them very much what it is to the professedly irreligious. In superstitious religion the world of spirit interpenetrates the world of sense to a fantastic degree; there are no indifferent actions; to put on the left shoe before the right may precipitate a catastrophe. And between these two extremes runs the whole gamut of religious thought. The perfect religion (whatever that may be) preserves the true balance of the two worlds; each affects the other according to reason and proportion.

In pre-Christian religions it was held that this double aspect of the universe demanded a double treatment. There were those —the vulgar—who could only appreciate the spiritual at its point of contact with the material; they were capable of offering sacrifice to more or less unknown powers, of performing certain ceremonies, and even of understanding certain elementary rules of conduct and thought. But the system presented to these was of a very coarse and materialistic nature.

Pre-
Christian
Religions

On the other hand, there were those of finer

Then at last, upon a world weary of misrepresentation of the Divine nature, came Christianity.

Now it is not my duty to lecture upon the truth of Christianity ; I assume that as a fact ; and I need do no more here than **Christianity** remark in passing the extraordinary manner in which it met and ratified, while it transcended, the devout guesses of ancient Mysticism, as well as fulfilling, as was to be expected, the anticipatory revelation made by God to the Jewish people. Yet even in this earlier revelation there were, to some extent, the two elements noticeable in pagan religions, and these, roughly speaking, were represented by the priests and the prophets. There was first the external ritual and observances of the Law ; there was also the internal significance of these things which, again and again, as the prophets tell us, became obscured by the letter in which it was conveyed. Yet in the Jewish religion the inner truth, lying as it did in the moral rather than the mystical plane, was never by intention confined to a select few ; and it was this that Christianity once more promulgated to the world at large.

But it did more than this ; it brought out

into the light of day the subjects of even pagan mystical thought. For the first time those things only hinted at to the initiated, and revealed even to them under symbols and images, became visible upon the historical stage. It was as the drawing up of a veil. The groaning of creation, hitherto inarticulate and mysterious, became audible as the cry of a fallen world for redemption; the noise of lustral waters, the strange forms and movements guessed at rather than seen, the lights and the faces full of terror to those who looked on them,—all these things were revealed as real and clear and friendly—far more “real,” in fact, than those symbols and images hitherto considered as the embodiment of Truth.

For the first time, then, in history these things became the property of the vulgar as well as the hidden treasure of the mystics, for the very reason that now these mysteries had come forward for enactment upon the historical stage. The Resurrection of the Dead could not be apprehended by the world until the miracle of Easter Day; the instinct for Parthenogenesis could not find its full expression until it did so actually in the

Revelation
of the
Mysteries

stable of Bethlehem ; the sacramental idea, so obvious in all heathen rites, however debased, could not be grasped by the uninitiate until the Incarnate Word of God took bread and wine into His venerable Hands ; the sacrifices of the heathen, monstrous as they often were, as well as the emphatically mystical offerings of the Jews, received their ratification to some extent and their fulfilment altogether, when the Immaculate Lamb shed His blood upon the Cross. Even the "demon" of Socrates seemed a fable to his friends, until in fire and wind there fell upon the world the Spirit of Truth to guide souls into all truth, and to abide with them.

It would seem, therefore, at first sight that there was no longer a place for Mysticism in the Divine economy. As our Blessed Lord told His disciples, they were to proclaim upon the housetops what **Is there, then, room for Mysticism in Christianity?** had hitherto been told only in the ear ; it was the boast of St Paul that his office was to reveal mysteries. That which prophets and kings had desired in vain to see, was now the possession of babes and sucklings. Surely at last, it seems, all things are to be open to all men, now that the supreme and final Revelation has been given !

Yet we must distinguish.

It is true that the veil has been drawn up, that a wide and splendid view has been made visible to the world, and that all men have eyes to see it if they will, yet it does not follow that all see it in the same degree, or that any see it adequately and comprehensively. In itself it is complete; it is strictly a Revelation of which the whole is present, yet those who look upon it realise only gradually all that it means, the correlation of its parts and the significance of its details.

The Sub-
jective
Element

Once more, then, we may recur to our fable of the field.

Three great classes of observers have stood and will stand always looking upon the vision that Christianity has disclosed—and the first is that of dogmatic theologians.

In this view of the Divine nature and action there is firstly an element of orderliness and union. Although at the first glance the observer may not perceive how intimately one part of the picture is related to another, yet as he stands and watches, little by little the unity comes home to him. The dogmatic theologian sees, for example, a string of pools, even at the first

The
"Dogmatic
Theo-
logians"

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The
“Dogmatic
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logians”

glance, but it is not until he has looked and counted and considered, that he understands that they are seven in number, and united by a stream. From the nature of the soil at his feet he deduces the composition of the mountain in the blue distance. It is his business, then, to observe, to classify, and to deduce; to see sources and connections; to bring the whole view little by little before his direct consciousness; and further, to state what he has learned, in such terms that others less erudite can understand it as he does.

And next there is the group of the devout—persons of no great learning or insight, incapable it may be of apprehending the “Devout” whole scheme in scholastic terms, yet endowed with the quick instincts that love alone can give. As the scientist or the pioneer, if he is to be successful, must be filled with a certain ardour; as the lover’s dull perceptions are quickened by his passion until he becomes almost the equal of an expert psychologist in discerning the half-hidden thoughts of his beloved; so those devout who cannot “discourse learnedly about the Trinity” or “define contrition,” are yet capable of perceiving what others do not, since they love God and hate

sin alike with passion. Where others, looking upon the same vision, hear only the rustle of the wind or the cry of beasts, these lovers of God hear His voice and His footsteps walking in His garden : where others see only a desolate waste, these see His footprints plain across the sand.

And finally, beside the dogmatic theologian and the man of prayer, stands the Mystic, the artist of the spiritual life, as hard The to define as the poet or the musician. “Mystics”

Now it is true that each of these three men must to some extent possess the qualifications of the others, if he is to become expert even in his own province. The theologian must pray, or he will not understand ; the devout must hold a defined creed, or his prayer will vanish into dreaming ; and the Mystic in the same manner must both understand and love, or he will not see clearly. Yet he has a special gift of his own, and this we may call The Gift of for the present the Art of Divine Divine Intuition. Intuition As the poet sees things invisible to the farmer and the geologist, as he is kindled by a sight of colour and form, unperceived by the others, yet objectively real, so the Mystic, looking upon the same facts,

whether natural or revealed, as the schoolman and the man of prayer, is aware of certain elements, and even of relations and significances invisible to these. It is true he has his penalties to pay: the Mystic, no less than the artist, is at anyrate at the outset of his career liable to glooms, despondencies, and obscurities of which the others know nothing; he is thought unstable, he is called a visionary, yet these charges are the natural outcome of his temperament; he is reprov'd, suspected, and even derided when he attempts to express in human language that which necessarily transcends it; further, he has the actual dangers that accompany the increase of responsibility. Unless he responds to the light he receives, and passes from intuition to union, embracing with his will that Cross of Christ which he has discerned uniting heaven and earth and all that is made, he will be in a worse state than he who has not received such endowments. Yet with all this he finds at least some compensation in the very fullness of the vision to which he is admitted. Looking upon nature and revealed dogma, he sees depths in them which others do not; the historical facts of Christianity which the

schoolman classifies, and in whose presence the devout finds material for prayer, glow for him in depth beyond depth of inexpressible beauty and meaning ; he sees their correlations and their self-evidences, and believes, not only because he hears, but because to some extent he also sees and handles.

II. We come next to a consideration of the various schools of this great body of thinkers, and this will lead us to understand in some degree how it is that those Schools of Mystics who claim direct intuition appear at times to vary in the account they give of the objects perceived by them. For it is a fact that they do at anyrate seem to differ—and this fact is used sometimes as an evidence that their visions are subjective and prejudiced, rather than objective and direct. The Indian, it is said, descries Nirvana ; the Catholic, the Beatific Vision ; and the Protestant, the heaven of his particular sect. Yet persons who advance this argument as conclusive, do not for a similar reason deny the reality of beauty in the world, because of the existence of impressionist and realist schools of art—still less because some artists paint in oils, and others in black and white.

However, the first two facts that we must reflect upon in our consideration concern the being of God Himself, and, indirectly the mode in which the spiritual world exists. This will to some extent give us a clue to the mystery.

The Im-
manence and
Transcend-
ence of God

God, we believe, may be looked upon from two sides: He is *immanent*, and He is *transcendent*.

By God's immanence we mean that in a certain degree He is present in the works of His hands, that all things subsist in Him, that all force is the effect of His energy, and that, accordingly, to some extent the Creator may be known by the study of creation.

The reign of law, the fact of beauty, a system of punishment and reward—all these things may be perceived as elements in God's nature, since there are such things as tides, sunsets, poison, and food.

But God is also transcendent; and by this we mean that the Creator is infinitely beyond the creature. Not only is He more than the sum of what He has made, but He exists in a mode utterly different from that in which all else exists. He is not only the First, but He is the Unique. No word, epithet, or verb

can be applied to Him or His action in precisely the same sense in which it is applied to ourselves or our actions. And it follows, therefore, that He cannot be absolutely known, adequately and completely.¹

Now either of these two truths, if taken separately, leads to error.

Immanence is a truth, but if we regard it

¹ It may be asked in this connection, How, if God is of this nature and exists in this mode so utterly different from that of His creatures, can that nature and mode be even perceived to be true of Him by those creatures? Certainly, say these opponents, such things may be true of God, but since, from the very statement of the case, it is impossible for us to apprehend them, how can we be in any way certain of them? Further, if we think that we perceive them by spiritual faculties, does not that prove that God's nature is not utterly different from our own, since its perception, however faintly, is within our range.

These are too intricate and far-reaching questions to be answered here. But, briefly, one direction along which the answer seems to lie is as follows:—There are two indisputable facts as regards human aspiration—one that it exists, the other that it never absolutely attains. The soul of the saint is at least as much athirst for God as the soul of the beginner. Aspiration towards God has been a continual experience of the human race, except where it has been deliberately stifled; yet aspiration grows more intense as it aspires. Attainment, in every branch of activity, is notoriously unsatisfying. These two lines, then, obviously never have yet in the experience of man found a meeting point; yet they are continually approaching one to the other. It seems, then, a probable conclusion

as the sole truth, we are led to that *impasse* known as Materialism. It is, indeed, a temptation to many souls to set out upon this path. When we consider the astounding intricacy and beauty of this world, its age, its vigour, and its perennial youth; when we

A strong
view of
Immanence
leads to
Materialism

that they cannot meet except at a point infinitely beyond the range of human experience; and this probable conclusion, when applied to the intricacies of human consciousness, has a remarkable success in solving them. Further, it may be pointed out that a man's "reach always exceeds his grasp"; that he may be conscious of a fact that he cannot master: he may perceive the nature of God in some degree by direct apprehension without in that act degrading God's nature to his own. This, as a matter of experience, is found to be true in practically every range of life. In art, in morals, and in other sciences, the soul is continually aware of the "relative," because, it would seem, he has a certain consciousness of the fact of the "absolute," a certain apprehension of a standard which he has never been able to formulate to himself. These phenomena, even logically considered, appear to point to an existence which is in relations with creation, but which also infinitely transcends it. So St Thomas Aquinas writes of the soul's consciousness of God: "With regard to God, we could not know whether He exists, unless we somehow knew what He is, even though in a confused manner."¹

These considerations, however, are quite apart from the further point as to whether God has not actually revealed the fact of His own Transcendence.

¹ *In Lib. Boetii de Trin.*, Opp. ed. Veneta altera, Vol. VIII., p. 342a.

see the upward development so plainly visible in art and science ; when we take into account the marvellous moral beauty of man's inner nature, and its power of subduing physical forces to itself ; and when, following out the thought of growth that science has made familiar to us, we prolong all these lines, century after century, ever in an upward direction, and conceive of the whole under the aspect of a Being working itself out to perfection—what wonder is it that many minds, viewing this astounding Image, fall down before it in adoration and love, and cry that for the first time they have found their God? This, then, is Pantheism, but its end is certain. If we allow ourselves to believe that creation is the limit of Him who made it, sooner or later we shall acknowledge that it is His origin also ; and we are forced back, if we accept what some scientists would have us believe, that the beetle has as much right to be called God as a superhuman man ; that sea-slime is not only divinely made, but is divine in itself ; and that all things, including a mother's love and a philosopher's discovery, have their origin in matter, and their end in physical death. As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be.

On the other side the truth of transcendence, taken by itself, leads us to a similar contradiction of instinct, and to this also, for some souls, there is no less a temptation. When we consider the limitations of nature, how that a man's "reach always exceeds his grasp," how that the matter in which he dwells and with which he is surrounded is perpetually dragging down and degrading the aspiration which he knows to be its superior; how his love generates hope, and hope faith, and how again and again his love once more steps in to ratify his intuitions and guesses—we are tempted sometimes to revolt against nature altogether, to despise the material creation as something either evil or non-existent—(and the history of heresy from the Gnostics to the Christian scientists abundantly illustrates the point)—we are tempted to seek God only in an escape from all that He has made.

This tendency, no less than that of Materialism, surely lies at the root of much of the present irreligion. While shallow souls, drowned in the world of sense, gradually lose consciousness of all religious sense, and formulate their experiences in the gospel of Material-

A wrong
view of
Transcend-
ence leads
to forms of
Gnosticism

ism, tracing back even the highest aspirations of human nature to one of two instincts—the Propagation and the Sustentation of Life—other souls, only a little less shallow, and fully as one-sided, perceiving that the activities of God are not God, and that the creature is always inadequate to the Creator, come to the opinion that God is wholly apart from the creature. They see that labels are only labels, and hastily conclude, by a remarkable logic, that they are misleading, and, in fact, not genuine labels at all. Hence we hear talk of those who are “above creeds and churches,” who “worship God in the open air,” who repudiate “dogma.” They conclude that because scholastic theology is not identical with personal religion, therefore it has no connection with it. It would be as sensible to argue that since horticulture is not the same thing as art, therefore it has nothing to do with flowers. Roughly speaking, then, these two classes, materialists and undenominationalists, divide between them the irreligious world of to-day; and each, we have seen, takes its origin from a one-sided rather than a false view of God. One sees His Immanence, the other His Transcendence; but neither sees both.

Christianity, on the other hand, holds both these truths, and finds their reconciling in the

<p>Truth of both found in Christi- anity</p>	<p>Incarnation of the Son of God. In this doctrine we see the reason- able relations of Spirit and matter, of the creature and the Creator.</p>
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God is transcendent ; He is above all creation and beyond it ; He is in His essence apart from it. Yet He made it, and keeps it in intimate union with Himself. More than that, the process which started into being with the creation of all things has been raised, in one instance, to a new form of union, which is indeed of amazing wonder, and yet, considered in the supernatural order, of equally amazing congruity.¹ God, who transcends the creation in which He is causally immanent, has completed and crowned that immanence by the wondrous assumption of a created human nature into personal union with Himself. This is the doctrine of the Incarnation. "God is a Spirit" : "The Word was made flesh." And from this in turn flows out with absolute inevitability, the sacramental system of the Catholic Church.

Now all this seems a digression ; yet it is

¹ Cf. *Summa Theologica*, III. i. 1 ; *contra Gentes*, iv. 54.

a digression necessary for the development of our theme. Here are the two truths about God, each necessary to the comprehending of the other ; and each of them representing, as it seems to me, the two great classes in which Mysticism groups itself.

Those whom we may call the "Immanence-Mystics" seem to have been prominent in Greece and Egypt in pre-Christian days. These were they who sought to know God through His works ; they perceived clearly enough the Divine energy working under aspects of nature, but, knowing nothing of transcendence, they mistook the Divine energy for Divinity itself. Under symbols of natural life, they adored nature. Of this kind the Eleusinian Mystics seem to have been ; it was the yearly resurrection of spring, itself truly a symbol of immortality, that they believed to be the secret of God ; in the principles of reproduction and generation they thought they had found the continuity of His life ; and in this line of thought, as we have observed, we see error, indeed, yet an error of omission and one-sidedness, rather than one of actual falsehood. The Greeks, with the exception perhaps of those who

thought along Platonic lines, recognised the Divine finger, and even the Divine energy in nature; and, since they were ignorant of God's transcendence, mistook His action for Himself.

Since, then, all minds, even apart from the religion held by them, have affinity with one or other of these truths about God—as, for example, one expert in prayer will find his highest achievements in contemplation, and another in the written liturgy of the Church, though both, if they are wise, will hasten to supplement their respective defects—so even among the Christian Mystics we shall observe the same tendencies.

There are some who think of God under mental images, who, recognising that He has expressed the profoundest laws of His Being in terms of time and space, rightly represent Him to themselves under those same terms; and among these we may place such a Mystic as

St Teresa

St Teresa. It was not that she did not perfectly know the truth of God's transcendence—(it is foolish even to assert that)—but that her mind being one of intense “Visualis- vividness and visualising power, and ing” God her desire chiefly to impart to others what she herself received, she sought always to

describe her intuitions in phrases of light and sound and form. Thus she compares the Godhead to a globe; she uses terms of marriage to express the way of union; she seeks always to reduce her apprehensions of transcendence to images of immanence.

So, too, Mother Julian of Norwich sees the Lord of evil under the image of a lean, foxy young man; so Von Eckhartshausen, describing the Communion of Saints, does so under terms that can only properly be applied to the Catholic Church; it has a chair, he tells us, a supreme pastor, and certain methods of study. Finally, St Francis of Sales, the St Francis easiest perhaps of all the Mystics to of Sales understand directly, can scarcely speak even of the spiritual aspirations and resolutions of the soul except under an image of flowers gathered and bound into a nosegay for the acceptance of the Beloved.

All these, then, with many others—and they are those who will always be the most popular, may be classed under the name of Immanence-Mystics. While holding firmly to the Catholic doctrine of God's transcendence, it is more natural to them to seek to describe the mysteries even of this under terms of the opposite truth.

Then, on the other hand, there is that school to whom it is natural to merge their view of immanence in the overwhelming light of "Transcend-
ence-
Mystics" transcendence; and these find their first exponents in early Gnosticism. "Matter is comparatively unimportant," these tell us; "the works of God are not to be compared with God as He is in Himself."

Here, again, is a true principle, so far as it goes. It only leads to error when it is emphasised to the exclusion of its correlative truth. It is true that when the claims of matter and spirit appear to clash, it is the former that must yield to the latter, since matter is the expression of spirit, not spirit of matter; it is true that God as He is, infinitely transcends all that He does. The Gnostics, therefore, like the Greeks, suffered through omission rather than positive falsehood.

They perceived that matter was inferior to spirit, that it hindered spirit under certain circumstances, and they came to the conclusion that spirit was essentially free of matter, and that material actions and things were its enemy. Hence they either drove matter from its proper servitude to spirit—thereby losing sight of the fact that the Word was made flesh

—they plunged into wild asceticism and even suicide: or they affected to despise matter, and plunged, still more ignobly, into vice. While holding, therefore, to the principle of God's transcendence, they ignored the equally important principle of His immanence.

And just as the school of Immanence-Mystics had its dunces and its scholars, so too with what we may call the Transcendence-Mystics. There are to be found among them those whose natural vocation it is to insist upon God's transcendence, Catholic saints St John of as well as heretical perverters of the the Cross whole: and supreme among these saints stands up St John of the Cross.

It would be foolish of me to attempt an exposition of the system of this prince of contemplatives; but very briefly it may be said that in his desire to grasp and to make known the transcendence of God, he could not bear to rest for more than an instant on any image which he knew so well to be inadequate to that for which it stood. He was for ever freeing himself, shaking himself loose of anything but the highest reality apprehended by him. He is as a man for whom the law of gravitation is

all but suspended ; he passes up and up into the high air in which all other creatures but those who share his supreme faculty find themselves giddy and bewildered. Again—it is foolishly unnecessary to say that he understood the immanence of God—he insists upon the use of the Sacraments, which, if we may say so, while not identical with the truths of immanence yet are congruous to them ; he tells us, as the Church tells us, to use statues and sanctuaries in our devotion, but he warns us that those who would rise high in the mystical life must beware of fettering themselves in a profusion of even sacred possessions ; in fact, through all his writings he is for ever soaring above all that is made, with the keen air that lies about the Throne of Him who made it.

The Three Steps There are the three steps, he tell us, up which all contemplative souls must pass—three nights of darkness and deprivation. The first is that of ordinary detachment, of the abandonment of physical likes and dislikes ; the second, of mental detachment from all imaginative thought ; and the third, the most profound blackness of all, in which even Divine communications, visions and messages, must be renounced—and there,

“where none appears,” he comes to His Beloved.¹

In later days we have seen the caricature of his system in the schools of the Quietists. Molinos² and Madame Guyon seized upon the truth that underlay the thought of St John of the Cross, and misunderstood it, and the evidence that they did so is to be found in the fact that their followers tended to abandon the use of the Sacraments. They perceived, as he did, that God in Himself

¹ “It is, therefore, supreme ignorance for any one to think that he can ever attain to the high estate of union with God before he casts away from him the desire of natural things, and of supernatural also, so far as it concerns self-love, because the distance between them and that which takes place in the state of pure transformation in God is the very greatest.”—(*Ascent of Mount Carmel*, Bk. I., chap. v., 2.)

“When thou dwellest upon anything, thou hast ceased to cast thyself upon the All. Because in order to arrive from all to the All, thou hast to deny thyself wholly in all.”—(*Ibid.* xiii. 10.)

² “Oh, what a treasure wilt thou find, if thou shalt once fix thy habitation in nothing! And if thou once gettest but snug into the centre of nothing, thou wilt never concern thyself with anything that is without. . . . This is the way of getting to the command of thyself, because perfect and true dominion do only govern in nothing; with the helmet of nothing thou wilt be too hard for strong temptations.”—(*The Spiritual Guide*, chap. xx.)

was transcendent of His action ; they knew that God was a Spirit, but they seemed to have forgotten (devotionally speaking) that He was also made Flesh. At first sight, perhaps, it appears as if the prayer of quiet, spoken of by St Teresa, resembled that system of devotion recommended by Madame Guyon, yet the difference is vital. While St Teresa never forgot for a moment that the deepest repose in God demands a tense energy of will, Madame Guyon, although certainly she repudiated the accusation, tended to teach that the most intimate entry into relations with God involved an entire relaxation of all the energies of the soul.¹ It was a far more noble mistake than that of the Gnostics, who, despising matter, wallowed in its abuse ; yet it has a certain affinity with theirs, and, if produced experimentally far enough along its deflected line, might even one day arrive at the same point.

Briefly, then, we have seen that the two

¹ "It is necessary that in all these operations the soul concur passively. It is true that in the beginning, before it cometh to this, it must be more active ; and then, according as the divine operation groweth stronger, the soul must gradually and successively yield and give way unto God, until it be perfectly absorbed in Him." —(*A Method of Prayer*, chap. xxiv.)

truths about God which the Christian religion proclaims to us—His transcendence and His immanence—account to some extent for the apparent variations between the teaching proposed to us by Catholic Mystics. It is not that St Francis holds one doctrine, and St John another; but that each, made as every man must be, in a mould approximating to the side of this or that truth, uses phrases and images which best express his meaning. They both look upon God, they both seek to interpret Him, and they are absolutely at one in what they actually believe about Him.

Diversity
of Mystics
result of
Diversity
of view

III. Finally, it is difficult to see how the work of the Mystics is to be safeguarded from error or garnered for posterity, except by the Catholic Church.

We have seen how the Mystics must be to a large extent individualists. It is true that they accept the religion to which they adhere, as an objective system of truth, but their work upon it depends largely on their own efforts and attainments. They do not rest content with a speculative or practical assent to revealed dogma—though

Safeguards
of Mysti-
cism

they do give this assent—but they seek to penetrate deeper than others into the formularies that enshrine truth. And we have seen, too, the inevitable tendency of any man who thinks deeply to rest upon one side of truth rather than another. Either he lives more easily in the atmosphere of transcendence than in that of immanence; or he desires to reduce the ineffable to terms of human speech: by nature and temperament he is an Idealist or a Realist.

If, then, there is no external living authority by which his supposed intuitions may be tested,

**External
Living
Authority**

it follows almost inevitably that he will ultimately verge either on the Gnostic position on the one side, or Pantheism on the other; and at the present day especially, in the outburst of “Christian Science” and of the “New Theology,” we have excellent illustrations of his double danger. Each of these systems of belief, as has been indicated, is the simple result of following out one truth about God to its logical end, to the exclusion of the other. “Christian scientists” can see nothing but transcendence, the “new theologians” nothing but immanence; and while

we may welcome the seed of truth that under the zeal of those two parties respectively has burst into such luxuriance in the non-Catholic world, and be thankful that in the result the old heavy Materialism held by the imperceptive of twenty years ago has received what is at the least a serious wound, we cannot help observing that such truths have been confidently and explicitly held for nineteen centuries by the Catholic Church, each balanced by the other, each interpreting its correlative. It may perhaps not be without significance that these two religious movements have taken place simultaneously. For over three hundred years in the Western world a large body of sincere and religious people has been separated from the unity of the Catholic Church; and that Protestant community has from almost the first moment of its existence been splitting indefinitely into further groups and sects, chiefly for local or personal reasons. Now it appears as if once more they were re-uniting on foundations of thought, but this time with the real and fundamental cleavage more visible than ever; they are uniting each on one of the two great truths about God, into two great camps. Is it impossible to hope

that when the process has gone a little farther, many souls at least among them will understand where the reconciliation is to be found, and will turn to that divinely safeguarded Body where both principles have been preserved from the beginning? For it is wonderful how Christian instincts have survived even amongst those who twenty years ago were considered the most dangerous opponents of revealed truth. It used to be considered almost a miracle if a scientist professed Christianity; and now, within the last few days, we have seen a "Catechism," put forward by one of the most eminent scientists of the time, containing statements concerning our Lord and the Christian religion generally, that are, literally taken, hardly distinguishable from the formularies of bodies that unhesitatingly claim to be orthodox.¹

It is strange, then, that Mysticism and

¹ *The Substance of Faith*, by Sir Oliver Lodge—*e.g.* : "I believe that the Divine Nature is specially revealed to man through Jesus Christ our Lord, who . . . has been worshipped by the Christian Church as the Immortal Son of God, the Saviour of the World. . . . It is our privilege through faithful service to enter into the Life Eternal, the Communion of Saints, and the Peace of God."—Pp. 132, 133.

Scholasticism have ever been thought by the world to be irreconcilable systems, above all, since, as we have seen, the Church has continuously honoured above all her children those who give themselves wholly to the contemplative life. So far from their being irreconcilables, each is in a sense necessary to the other—or, rather, it is within the Catholic fold alone that the two find their true positions. If the dogmatic theologian needs the clear sight of the Mystic for encouragement in his work and for the discernment of truths which, if they are to be practical, must be reduced to form, the Mystic no less needs the dogmatic theologian to warn and correct him when his ardours begin to pass from the objective to the subjective plane. The Mystic, it is true, sees that which to his companion is invisible, or at least of doubtful value; yet that companion on his side holds in an orderly scheme the truths revealed by God on the historical and dogmatic plane, and without the test of these there is no knowing to what wildnesses the seer might not commit himself.

Mysticism
and
Scholasticism mutually necessary one to the other

And the Church is the Mother of them both: she raises St Thomas as well as St John of the

Cross to her altars, and challenges the world to find a contradiction between them. The geologist does not lose by the intuitions of the poet; the poet is none the worse, but rather the better, for understanding the history of the soil that the geologist can give him.

Above all, it is in the Church and the Church alone that the two great truths about God are presented in apprehensible relations one with another. While she encourages the Mystic with her approval, she teaches by her system of practical devotion as well as by her precepts, that faith and not insight is the foundation of the necessary virtues. Mysticism is in no sense the one path that all her children must tread, although it is that of some of the greatest of her children. Yet all that is necessary she presents to us, under a doctrine which as far transcends all that the Mystic can learn, as God in Himself transcends all that He does. She places before us, in the person of Jesus Christ, Him who at once tabernacles amongst us on the natural plane as well as dwells in the bosom of the Transcendent Deity.

**The
Incarnation**

For in the Incarnate Word of God there is, as we have seen, the perfect union of the two truths under a transfigured

form that calls out our adoration and love, rather than our adequate comprehension. "Have I been so long a time with you, and have you not known me? . . . He that seeth me, seeth the Father also."¹ He who is the "image of the invisible God," is also the "firstborn of every creature. For in Him were all things created. And He is before all; and by Him all things consist."²

Further, in the sacramental system she pursues the logical continuation of that great central event, and presents to us spiritual gifts under material forms, teaching us that, normally speaking, those gifts actually cannot be obtained except under those forms, and at the same time, that God in His essence infinitely transcends all that He has made and deigns to use. And, above all, in the Sacrament of the Altar, the very centre and sun of her worship, from which all other devotions radiate and to which all aspire, she presents to her children those two immeasurable truths, each of which is necessary to the interpretation of the other, under a form that her smallest child can grasp.

The Sacra-
mental
System

Sacrament
of the Altar

¹ John xiv. 9.

² Coloss. i. 15-17.

God is immanent: He is in all that He has made; and under the appearance of the Sacred Host not only is His Godhead present, but there is also present that human nature which He has assumed and united to Himself eternally. God is transcendent; the laws of time and space, compelling to the creature, are in no sense the limits of the Creator. Therefore at one and the same time that Sacred Humanity is in ten thousand places; Christ is born in the House of Bread, dies mystically upon Calvary, and dwells at the Right Hand of the Majesty on high, all in one eternal instant, in virtue of that transcendent life which from all eternity has been His; yet He does so under material appearances.

Here, therefore, before the Blessed Sacrament, kneel with equal adoration and love the Prince of Transcendence, St John of the Cross, and the little one who, though understanding little beyond that within the range of his senses, is at least as dear to God as the wise and the prudent, in whose image and likeness He came down from heaven.

APPENDIX I

QUESTIONS ASKED AT THE CLOSE OF THE LECTURE

Q. Would the lecturer kindly give us a definite statement of what he understands by the word "Mysticism"? What would be a legal definition?

A. A common definition of Mysticism is, "The Art of Divine Intuition." But this does not seem satisfactory, as, coupled with the faculty of insight, is the responsibility of corresponding with it effectually. A better definition, therefore, of Mysticism is, "The Art of Divine Union."

Q. What proof is there that the Mystic's view is more than a subjective one? And if so, how can we check such view with objective fact?

A. One proof is found in the fact that Mystics of widely differing religions agree to a large extent as to the objects of mystical intuition. This has been pointed out in the lecture. The only manner by which such intuitions can be checked is, obviously, by one objective revelation divinely guaranteed—in other words, by the Catholic Church. Apart from that, it does not appear as if there were any test of individual "revelations."

Q. What is the difference between the Catholic practice of Mysticism and the Quietistic doctrine?

A. This is a large question. Very briefly, however, it was taught by the Quietists that the highest exercise of man's faculties in prayer lay in complete passive repose; while Catholic Mystics teach that although there need not be any feverish activity of the intellect or heart in prayer, yet that the attitude of the will must be one of tense effort; and that it is in this attitude of positive adherence to God that the supreme "repose" of the soul is found. It is only fair, however, to add that Madame Guyon at anyrate repudiated the Quietistic interpretation of her teaching.

Q. Have you not rather overstated Sir Oliver Lodge's allegiance to revealed religion?

A. I did not mean that Sir Oliver Lodge professed any real allegiance at all to what is properly known as "Revelation." On the contrary, his line appears to be that truth is found by man's own consciousness raised to the highest pitch, rather than by any actual external revelation from God. But it is at least remarkable that this eminent scientist, approaching Christianity from the purely human side, should use language so nearly approaching orthodoxy. He seems to find, on the human side, a need and instinct for the full Christian truth as proposed to us by the Catholic Church; and this is, at anyrate, a great advance from the old materialistic position of scientists twenty years ago.

Q. Has the Mystic a special "sense," or do all men possess it?

A. All men possess the sense in some degree, just as all men possess the artistic sense. A high cultivation of the mystical sense is, however, no more essential to attaining salvation than is the cultivation of the artistic sense to physical efficiency.

Q. Granting the experience (of a Mystic) to include the sense of personal touch with Deity, what *extra* reference to authority is required, except in behalf of a worn-out convention?

A. This external reference is required, as has already been pointed out, for the correction of individual temperaments. However closely a Mystic may apprehend God, yet he cannot escape from the bias of his own individuality in interpreting that apprehension. He needs, therefore, a continual and divinely guaranteed standard by which he may test his experiences.

Q. Were not the Rosicrucians Mystics? And did they not communicate with the spiritual world? Yet they were not always believers in God.

A. There is, practically, no more impossibility that a man should be in relations with the spiritual world, and yet not believe in God, than that he should be in relations with the material world, and yet not believe. God is in both; yet certain conditions must be fulfilled before He can be recognised explicitly and clearly. I was not aware that any Rosicrucians explicitly disbelieved in God, though no doubt some of them used unfamiliar phrases.

APPENDIX II

The following books may be consulted in connection with the subject of this Lecture:—

Henri Joly.—*The Psychology of the Saints.*

David Lewis.—*Life of St John of the Cross.*

St John of the Cross (Zimmerman).—*The Ascent of Mount Carmel.*

“Saints Series” (ed. by Henry Joly).—*Saint Teresa.*

Henry James Coleridge.—*Life and Letters of Saint Teresa.*

Bevan.—*Three Friends of God (Tauler, Nicholas of Basle, Suso).*

T. F. Knox.—*Life of Suso.*

Walter Hilton (ed. by J. B. Dalgairns).—*Scale of Perfection.*

George Tyrrell.—*Juliana, Anchoret of Norwich.*

Augustin Baker (ed. by Abbot Sweeney).—*Holy Wisdom.*

Von Eckhartshausen.—*The Cloud upon the Sanctuary.*

W. R. Inge.—*Studies of the English Mystics.*

WESTMINSTER LECTURES

(THIRD SERIES)

EDITED BY REV. FRANCIS AVELING, D.D.

THEORIES OF THE TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS

BY THE

REV. J. GIBBONS, PH.D.

LONDON AND EDINBURGH
SANDS AND COMPANY

ST LOUIS, MO.

B. HERDER, 17 SOUTH BROADWAY

1907

PREFACE

ANY attempt at an exhaustive study of the various theories about the soul's destiny would be beyond the plan of these lectures.

Each theory has its own extensive bibliography—and how extensive that is may be inferred from the catalogue of more than 5300 volumes about the soul, "about it and about,"¹ which forms the appendix to Alger's *History of the Doctrine of a Future Life*.

All that has been attempted here is a rude outline of some of the more general beliefs or imaginings of mankind on the subject, followed by a brief statement of the scholastic theory of the nature of the soul, from which we may infer its destiny.

Arguments purely theological have been as far as possible avoided. The reader is advised

¹ "Myself, when young, did eagerly frequent
Doctor and Saint, and heard great argument
About it and about: but evermore
Came out by the same door where in I went."

OMAR KHAYYÁM.

to consult Dr Aveling's Lecture, "On the Immortality of the Soul," in the First Series of Westminster Lectures.

As none of the questions raised at the close of the lecture bore directly upon the subject treated, neither they nor the answers given are printed. For the most part, the difficulties they suggested arose (1) from faulty terminology; (2) from a confusion of sensation, simple apprehension, and thought; (3) from the imaginative intrusion of material conditions into the conception of the spiritual. As a general answer to such difficulties, the perusal of some work on First Principles is recommended. That of Fr. Rickaby, in the Stonyhurst Series, will be found of great use in meeting so broad and vague a misconception.

In compiling the present lecture, such sources of information as Alger's *Future Life*; Lilly's *Ancient Religion and Modern Thought*; and L. Janssens' *Summa Theologica IV*. have been freely used, and the writer would acknowledge that they have been "a lamp to his feet and a light to his paths."

J. GIBBONS.

MIDDLESBROUGH.

THEORIES OF THE TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS

MAN has been defined as a metaphysical animal:—"With the exception of man," says Schopenhauer, "no being wonders at its own existence. If anything in the world is worth wishing for, it is that a ray of light should fall on the obscurity of our being and that we should gain some explanation of life's riddle:—temples, churches, pagodas, mosques, in all lands, at all times bear witness by their splendour and vastness to this metaphysical need in man."

"What am I?"

"An infant crying in the night,
An infant crying for the light."

The two great facts of human experience, as it seems to me, are the sense of the absolute and the sense of sin: the sense of a Being to whom we owe our life, and in whom all that

deserves the name of life must find its nourishment, and the sense of something wicked and inexplicable which separates us from that Being.

It is upon these two facts that every religion rests. The feeling that we are born under two laws—the law of virtue and the **Basis of Religion** law of sin (if I may so express it)—the sentiment of the Infinite, and of our need of help from it.

Every religion, true or false (and there is some truth in every religion), is an attempt to bridge over this abyss: and the history of the human race is the history of its religions—the history of man's success or failure to pass from this world to the world beyond—to pass from the world of sensation and grasp the underlying substance of things—the history of man's success or failure in his search after knowledge and truth, which is but the reaching out of man's soul after God, its beginning and last end; for, as St Augustine says, "Our hearts are made for Him, and are ever restless till they rest in Him"—or, as the Singer of Israel, "As the stag brayeth after the waterbrooks, so longeth my soul unto Thee, O God."

It is the cry of an exiled race: it is the poetry of a fallen creation.

There have been times in the history of our

race when mankind turned a deaf ear to the promptings of the spirit within and gave itself up to the gratifying of the bodily wants, saying, "Let us eat and drink and crown ourselves with roses, for to-morrow we die." But louder than the din of this world's joys and pleasures rang the complainings of the neglected soul, shattering the wine-cup at the festive board with its warning, *non omnis moriar*:—"I shall not altogether die. Who will deliver me from the body of this death?" "For, as a shell, man is murmurous of immortality." And at last the message of peace and hope came forth from Judea, giving light to them that sat in darkness and opening the gates of immortality to man.

Nevertheless, there remains in the depths of our fallen human nature an imperishable instinct of revolt against Christianity —an impatience of control and limitation which reveals itself in every age and is not absent in our own, which returns gladly and willingly to one or other form of pagan philosophy and belief because it finds there certain instincts satisfied and certain dreams realised

Impatience
of
Restraint

"It turns away in loathing from Christianity, and silently accuses it of having stifled the legitimate aspirations and development of humanity in suppressing the instincts of the

flesh, and in relegating to a future life pleasures which should be found here below; and in destroying the world of enchantment Paganism had set up with license and pleasure as divinities, to substitute a world of gloom wherein humility, poverty, and chastity are keeping watch at the foot of a Cross."¹

To go back to the close of the eighteenth century, a wave of this reaction more than ordinarily universal passed over the old world of Europe, giving birth to a series of social upheavals which for a time promised all things fair under the protection of the goddess Reason—but inevitably developed into the practice of Pig Philosophy. Such a system could not long satisfy the hunger of man's heart, and produced a pessimism which became more and more pronounced as the nineteenth century grew older and felt the "world-pain" more keenly.

Thus the great result of that social upheaval which tried to dissolve the idea of God and drive Him out of His own world, was to throw men back on themselves, to fill their hearts with bitterness, disenchantment, life-weariness, and despair.

It has been observed by Jean Paul Richter that "no one in nature is so much alone as the denier of God."

¹ Ozanam.

To this terrible feeling of loneliness may be traced that intense and morbid self-consciousness which is the special note of the modern mind, the necessary product of its all-absorbing scepticism, and the source of its despondency.¹

For a parallel, we must go back to the days of Seneca and Petronius and Marcus Aurelius—writers and thinkers by a not strange coincidence popular in a recent day. For, indeed, the sentiment characteristic of the moribund Roman Empire presents a curious affinity to that which found expression but lately among us. It is sicklied over with the same pale cast of thought, the same morbid self-inspection and egoistic melancholy.

From this desolation of mind, from this obsession by the enigma of life, there has grown up around us a craze for Psychology.

Psychology is a subject no one can escape from at the present day—the world has gone crazy on it. It is an epidemic found not only in novels and in monthly ^{Psychology} magazines, but in the daily press. Psychology of the brain, of the nerves, of pictures (God save the mark!); and since on these people's showing the soul is nothing but a matter of

¹ Cf. Lilly's *Ancient Religion and Modern Thought*, chap. i.

molecular mechanics, there is no reason why we should not have psychology of a gramophone, or of a motor-car.

Let me give you an example of what is called Psychology. If a harpoon be stuck in the tail of a whale, the impression requires time to be transmitted to the whale's brain along the afferent nerve before the whale becomes conscious of the pain, and another period of time is needed for the transmission of an impulse from the brain along a motor nerve to set the tail in motion. There are thus five different stages of the phenomenon. (1) The excitation of the end-organ producing the neural change. (2) The conduction of the neural change along the afferent nerve to the brain. (3) The transmission of the sensory impression into the motor impulse. (4) The transmission of the motor impulse back along the efferent nerve to the appropriate muscle. (5) The contraction of this muscle into the signalling action when the whale wigwags its distress.

This is what is called Psychology at the present day. As a matter of fact it is only physiology. But when men had denied God, they were also bound to deny the separate entity of their own souls ; and hence all human thought and human endeavour became reduced to the same level

Or Physi-
ology?

and weighed in the same balance as the flicking of a whale's tail or the jumping of a flea.

Consciousness, they tell us, is a certain form of force, *i.e.*, molecular action. It can pass into space, and no more ceases to be consciousness after it has leaked out of the brain than electricity ceases to be electricity after it has leaked out of the wire. The plain English of which is, that just as we can measure electricity by volts and amperes, and heat by calories, so we ought to be able to devise an instrument for measuring human thought—so much nerve, so much muscle, so many cells, so much grey matter of the brain, and, as Mr Dooley says, "There we are."¹

Once they taught us that a large brain was synonymous with a great intellect, but it was soon found that the brains of the Mohawks and Hottentots weighed more than those of the men of genius in Europe.

Then the complexity and thickness of the convolutions of the brain were fixed on as an explanation of this difficulty; but, in that respect, it was found that the dull ox can beat us all. Lastly, it was whispered that the phosphorus of the brain was its intellectual principle, and for a time men fed furiously on

¹ Cf. Rev. T. J. Campbell, S.J., in *The Messenger*, Jan. 1902.

fish for brain fag. But another whisper went abroad that the animals which have the largest supply of phosphorus in their dome of thought were the sheep and the goose, and so once more the geese saved the Capitol.

If the soul be a nonentity and thought a mechanical process, then morality becomes a matter of sentiment in which there is no question of God, or freedom, more than in the working of the laws of gravitation, the laws of climate, or of physical motion.

This was the great discovery of the last century, that man is only an aggregate of **Mechanical** cells—the will and all that is but **View of** the succession of cellular vibrations **Thought** —and the action of the mind, as it is called, is only the combination of brain waves as they pass over the delicate nerves and tissues of the cerebellum.

Something in the same way as the sound of the voice or the most delicate touch will cause the exquisitely fine vibrations of the telephone, so our sensations excite a series of vibrations on the highly sensitive nerve-centres of the brain, and we come to feel, and think, and reason.

If this be indeed so, if the soul is nothing more than the sum total of nerves and tissues, then a heartache means no more than a stomach-

ache ; and not Shakespeare's poetry alone, but all the poetry and art of the world, is nothing but a doctor's diagnosis in metre or in colour.¹ Science has dissected man, has discovered atoms and combinations, fertilisations, and energies and polarisations, crystallisations and visible phenomena, how they regularly go together, and how they come one after another : but it has found no soul and no God, and it teaches the healing Gospel of Eternal Death.

“ O muse of Sicily, begin the dirge,”

(sang the old Greek poet Moschus),

“ Woe, woe ! The mallows dying in the garden
 Or the green parsley and the florid anise
 Revive again, spring up another year !
 But we, the great, the mighty, and the wise,
 Once laid in death, lie voiceless in earth's bosom
 A long, a boundless, unawakened sleep.”

However, the old adage that history repeats itself finds once more a striking illustration. The swing of the pendulum of thought from this extreme of materialism and scepticism has set on foot a reaction towards mysticism and credulity which has resulted in the rehabilitation amongst us of the occult sciences by the infusion into

**Reaction
 against
 Materialism**

¹ Mallock, *Veil of the Temple*.

prevalent materialism, of religious and philosophical ideas, native to Southern Asia, which the researches of professional Orientalists have laid open to our own century.

Men have wearied of the clatter of the machine shop, and the hard contact of physical facts, and are longing for the ideal and the spiritual. So a wave of mysticism is upon us which finds its expression not only in the advent of various gnosticising sects, but in such delicately sentimental schools of thought as New England Transcendentalism, the New Theism of France, and in some more fashionable forms of Atheism such as the Positivism of Harrison, and, to a certain extent, the New Theologies. It is absorption into the Absolute, whether that be called God, or the Unconscious, or the Higher Self, which is held up as the goal of all exalted human endeavour.

It has been remarked that the present tide of mysticism is parallel to that which swept over Europe in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when men grew weary of the dry disputations of the schools, and the parched spirit asserted its rights against the satiated intellect ; which lasted until the fall of Constantinople, and the invention of printing brought about a renewed intellectual activity ; which busied

itself with classical and learned research rather than with scholastic analysis.

Those who are acquainted with the history of thought may note another swing of the pendulum in the emotional extremes of the Evangelicals succeeding the Theological controversies of the Reformation, only to be supplanted in turn by the materialistic philosophies of France, Germany, and England. The mystical reaction against Scholasticism, the sentimental or emotional reaction against Protestantism, and the transcendental reaction of the last century against the scientific and practical absorption of the age, are certainly closely analogous.¹

Now mysticism is the essence of all true religion, for union with God is the very aim of all supernatural life; and that union must necessarily be interior and recondite. Union, however, does not mean absorption.

Yet it is no wonder that this most difficult and dangerous because most exalted of all practical religious ideas, should have been misunderstood and have given rise to most noxious errors, when the main outlines of religious tradition had been lost to view.

It is altogether beyond my scope and power

¹ Cf. "Theosophy," *The Globe Review*, April 1893.

to develop this train of thought—let me, however, suggest it.

In the dawn of our race, everything spoke to man of God—of His works, of His promises—the sun, the moon, the stars, the deep sea waters, the darkness and the storm. But as passion and worldly interest withdrew the attention of men from the sacred traditions, they forgot the sacred truths these things embodied. They mistook the symbol for the thing symbolised, and so nature-worship came into being. It is hardly a step from nature-worship to Pantheism.

There is a line of almost natural and inevitable development from the primitive error of nature-worship to its culmination in Agnostic Buddhism.

But the sense of sin—of imperfection, of retribution—remained, and necessitated the purgatorial idea; and hence arose
Metem- such errors as metempsychosis and
psychosis other forms of reincarnation.

The notion that when the soul leaves the body it is born anew in another body, seems to be almost coeval with history. We find traces of it among the early Egyptians, and it was and is almost universal amongst the Hindus. To a large extent it swayed the philosophies of Greece in the days of Pytha-

goras, Plato, and Plotinus. We find it even among the Canadian Indians, who limit it to the souls of little children, who, they thought, being balked of this life in its beginning, would try it again.

In seeking to account for the extent and grasp of this belief, there are several considerations calling for attention.

**Causes of
the Belief**

(1) The universal belief of reflecting man in the continued existence of the soul after separation from the body ; which, besides being founded on man's longing or desire for immortality, is strengthened by the distinction he draws between the thinking substance and its material vesture.

"Whence comes this universal belief in man's immortality"? it was recently asked of Cardinal Gibbons, and his reply is worth recording: "Not from prejudice arising from education, for we shall find it prevailing among rude people who have no education whatever, and we must conclude that a sentiment so general and so deep-rooted must have been planted in the human heart by Almighty God, just as He implanted in us an instinctive love for truth and justice."

(2) Then, too, this theory of Transmigration offers an explanation of much evil and human suffering and injustice in the world. Thus, if

a man be born deaf or blind, or an idiot, or noble or generous, it is because in a former life he either abused his privileges and is now expiating his guilt, or lived virtuously and is now reaping the reward.

But, as Dr Hedge humorously points out: "If here and there some noble doer or prophet voice suggests the idea of a *revenant* from a better land—and if, on the other hand, 'the superfluity of naughtiness' displayed by some abnormal felon, seems to warrant the suspicion of a visit from the pit—the greater portion of mankind is much too green for any plausible assumption of a foregone training in good or evil. This planet is not their missionary station, nor their Botany Bay, but their native soil."

(3) Then again, the theory of transmigration, inasmuch as it supports the pre-existence of the soul, seems to explain the fragmentary visions and incongruous thoughts of which we all have experience. Learning a fact, meeting a face for the first time, we are puzzled with an obscure assurance that it is not for the first time: (such tricks does memory play us). This is Plato's theory of Reminiscence—we have lived many times before—and through the clouds of sense and imagination float the veiled vision of things that were.

Thus he held that when man's life on earth in the body begins, it is not a creation but a union, or an imprisonment rather, of an intellectual principle already existing, in so much matter—a union which terminates at death, when the prison doors are opened. The body is thus a mere instrument of the soul, and not an essential part of man's nature.

“ Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting.
 The soul that rises with us—our life's star—
 Hath had elsewhere its setting
 And cometh from afar ”—¹

The whole theory presents two points of great moral truth and power. It embodies in a concrete shape the fact that a brutal or sinful mode of life brings a man down to the level of the brute and the fiend; while the attainment of nobleness of soul and of character elevates him to the angelic and Divine.

However it may fare with us here and now, it teaches that justice reigns in the universe, and, sooner or later, the soul will be compensated for every tittle of its merit in good or evil. There is no escaping the chain of acts and consequences.

This entire scheme of thought has always allured the mystics to adopt it. There is,

¹ Wordsworth's Ode—*Intimations of Immortality*.

however, this difference between Philosophic and Christian mysticism, that the one is based on the natural cognation of the soul with the Deity; the other is founded on supernatural union with Christ by His Spirit.

It is to the East we must go for the earliest and most systematised teaching of the theory of Transmigration.

Earliest Theories of Transmigration The most ancient Hindu doctrine of the fate of man, as given in the Veda, may be briefly stated as follows:—"When a man dies, the earth is invoked to lie lightly on his body, and he himself is thus spoken to—"Go forth on the ancient paths our fathers in old times have trodden.'"

Varuna thrusts the wicked down to darkness, but the good are glorified with a spiritual body like to the gods, and Yama the first man is the head of renewed humanity in another world. However, the mystical temperament and unbounded imagination of the Hindu race did not long preserve this simple teaching, and so the Veda gave rise to the Upanishads and the Vedanta, wherein is taught a sort of spiritual Pantheism which asserts that one spirit is the only real being in the universe.

We are separated from that spirit by the body alone. To speak of ourselves as ourselves is ignorance, and all the gods, men, and demons,

and various grades of animal life, compose one cosmic family, constantly interchanging their residences in a succession of rising and sinking existences according to the law of retribution, which is summed up in the saying, "eating the fruits of former acts," and "bound in the chains of deeds."

As far as their general teaching goes, there is little difference between Brahminism and Buddhism. Both are pervaded by a profound horror of personal existence and a desire for emancipation from the chain of deaths and births.

But while the final aim of Brahminism is absorption into the Infinite Being, Buddha makes the goal *Pari-Nirwana*, or annihilation; for, strictly speaking, in Buddhism the final dissolution of the body at the last transmigration leaves nothing to be absorbed, and consequently *Pari-Nirwana* is simply cessation of all being. The very fundamental proposition of Buddhism is that all possible forms of existence are full of *Ill* and Sorrow; and the one ideal of the Buddhist is to escape this ceaseless whirl of sorrow to *Nirwana's* shore of Peace.

Let me, however, assure you that this is mere theoretic Buddhism, and finds little favour in the aims and thoughts of the millions of

Buddhist adherents to-day ; for Buddha himself has become a Deity to them and his Nirwana an Elysian Field. The apex of all the desires, the ambition of the most religiously minded of Buddhists in modern times (except, perhaps, the Buddhist of modern fashionable philosophy), points to a life in one of the heavens, while the great mass of the people aim only at elevating themselves to a higher condition of bodily existence in their next birth on this earth.

Buddhism may be summed up as a scheme for the perfecting of oneself by accumulating merit, with the ultimate view of annihilating at least all consciousness of self.

The self to be got rid of in Buddhism is not the selfishness condemned by Christianity—the law of the members—the self which rebels against the higher law, but rather the self of individuality, the self of personal identity.

What is the cause of misery and suffering? (asks the Buddhist Catechism). Old age and death. What is the cause of old age and death? Birth. Of birth? Continuity of becoming. Of continuity of becoming? Clinging to life. Of clinging to life? Desire to live. Of desire to live? Consciousness. Of consciousness? Ignorance.

So that enlightenment, Truth, Buddhahood,

consists in the discovery that *we* do not exist at all, and hence in ceasing to exist:—a Hegelian sort of idea that being and not being are identical.

Buddhism and Christianity both tell us not to love the world, but the one tells us that it is an illusion, an ignorance—that existence is evil; the other tells us that the world is the creature of God which, if used properly, will lead us to the knowledge of God—the great Enlightenment. “Rejoice and be glad,” it says to us. “The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood from the things that are made.” “It was this,” said Matthew Arnold, “made the fortune of Christianity, its gladness, not its sorrow. Not its assigning the spiritual world to God and the material to the devil, but its drawing from the spiritual world a source of joy so abundant that it overran the material world and transfigured it.”

Brahminist and Buddhist alike teach transmigration, but with a difference. Let us compare them a moment with the materialist. The materialist holds that there is no soul, that what we call soul is a mere hypothesis to account for states of consciousness, that the human being is an aggregate of cells and nothing more, that death disconnects the cells

and partitions the human machine—death ends all.

The Brahmin believes in a soul that hides behind the walls of flesh, and when the bodily mechanism, to which it is for the moment attached, runs down, that soul passes over to begin life anew in another body, and thus continues its *via purgativa*.

But the Buddhist takes a middle way. He holds, with the materialist, that the soul is but a collection of phenomena with no corresponding noumenon. But death does not end all. He denies the existence of a soul to pass over, yet maintains that the forces of life hold together—the Karma, or doing—the deeds of each individual life hold together and spring forth anew in the new being just born at the very instant of the other's death; and the extent of persistence of identity between the newly born and the recently dead is expressed in the words—*Na ca so: na ca anno*: It is not he: and yet it is not another.

A very clever attempt to offer a plausible explanation of this theory was made in the *Buddhist Quarterly* of December 1903. We are asked to suppose two men standing by the shore of a lake watching the waves breaking on the shore. The one has an untrained mind, the other a scientific one. If you ask

the one what a wave is, he will reply,—a mass of water that moves over the surface by the power of the wind. Whereas the other knows that the particles of water are only rising and falling in their places, and that each particle in turn is passing on its motion to its neighbour: to him there is no translation of matter—only a translation of force. So is it with the wave upon life's ocean which now mounts into being. It *is not* the same as that which, but a moment previous, sank to rest. Yet it *is* the same, inasmuch as it is the passing on of the mental forces—the doing of that other life.

And the writer goes on: "What is it we mean when we speak of a particular man—say, John Smith?" Surely not his body, but the sum total of his mental and other faculties or energies. Now, the human body is a machine, and the total of its energies may be estimated like that of any other machine. When we calculate this to heat-units, we find it may be roughly set down as one-half horse power. This energy goes to carrying on the vital functions and physical work. But we cannot directly estimate the work done by the brain. However, taking as a basis the amount of deoxidised blood that comes from the brain as a measure of its work, we find one-fifth of

the blood-supply is used there, and therefore one-tenth horse power of one's whole energy is absorbed there, half of which goes in those cognitions and perceptions, or thoughts, which make the peculiar character of the man. Whatever thought is, it is accompanied by molecular changes in the brain, and all molecular changes excite characteristic vibrations in the ether, and a thinking man is thus constantly emanating a series of vibrations peculiar to himself; and had we a spectroscope capable of perceiving and analysing these vibrations, we should be able to identify John Smith so long as he lived and affected the ether in his own peculiar way. It may not be many years before the substance is discovered which will reach to these thought emanations (and then Zanzic-nalling will be universal).

Now, consider the moment of John Smith's death. During life he has not only been setting in motion the great ocean of ether, but he has been storing up in the cells of his own brain a representation of all phenomena of the ages when John Smith was in the making.

Death comes. The subtle apparatus we call the brain is shattered—the locked-up energy bursts forth—each cell is discharged. The man dies—his death perturbs the ether;

and even as sodium vapour will absorb sodium light, so, at that very instant, the brain of some new-born child receives the impact, and thrills with a new life; or, as the Buddhists put it, "A new lamp is lighted from the dying flame." And in like manner with all men. Some few, with lives and instincts little above the brute, may at their death evolve such waves as can only stimulate some animal to life; whilst others may have so lived that only a higher birth than that as man can fulfil the noble life they led. Surely all this is a very thinly veiled materialism.

I have dwelt at some length on this system, not only because its myriad adherents in India believe in transmigration, nor because it finds favour with many Europeans, but because it is the key to our modern sentimental-mystical materialism—I mean theosophy, which teaches a transmigration of its own.

Brahminism held out as the final bliss of man, absorption into the eternal reality from which all had come.

Buddhism taught annihilation as the heaven of man's desires. Theosophy derives from both. It involves the same long series of metempsychoses and re-
Theosophy
 incarnations, subject to the same merciless and unforgiving law of Karma—the chain of

acts and consequences—but the final reward for the good man is absorption into the eternal reality, where in some mysterious way loss of individuality is not involved; whereas the wicked sinks lower and lower, and the final doom before him is complete annihilation, so that “he shall be as if he never was.”

But the God of all alike is an impersonal entity, from which all living things have emanated, and to which they must in the end return—the unconscious and unknowable of modern philosophies: “the rootless root of all that was, and is, and ever shall be.”

I have spoken of this modern wave of mysticism as the revolt of man’s spirit against the materialism of the age, and I have suggested that there exists in man’s spirit, together with a longing for the unseen, an impatience of control, and of reward or punishment meted out by an omnipotent ruler.

The mysticism of Theosophy meets these various requirements to a large degree. It talks wisely of a world beyond the world of sense, and it does not interfere with man’s desire for freedom from responsibility to anyone but himself, inasmuch as it proclaims him master of his own future by reason of the law

of the chain of acts and consequences in a manner more Oriental than the Orientals themselves. Its psychology also is Oriental. Instead of recognising in man a body and a soul, it recognises seven constituents : of these, four are perishable ; three are eternal. After death the eternal part passes into a state of repose for a time, during which it is brought into contact with the Great Reality, previous to being born again to the fresh period of probation to which it is destined. And if we object that men in general have no recollection of this previous existence, we are told that it is only when the higher stages of development are reached that memory can look back on the past and recall its previous history. Truly, a very arbitrary answer.

The whole universe, then, is composed of a countless number of beings—the good always working their way upward, by slow degrees it may be, until they have so completely thrown off the ties of soul to things material that they are fit for absorption into the Great Reality ; the wicked gradually working downwards, until, having exhausted the *imperishable* element in their nature, they sink into nothingness by a process of self-induced annihilation.

How an imperishable element can be

gradually exhausted, or how the imperfect **Contra-** can by degrees become the infinitely **dictions** perfect, are things that one can neither imagine nor conceive.

It is impossible to argue against this theory along the lines of ordinary logic. It divides mankind into the good and the worthless. But what is goodness? Whence have we notions of right and wrong, virtue and vice? There is no law, even of Karma, without a law-giver, and no law-giver without an intelligence and a personality.

But rather than admit the necessity of postulating a personal God, they tell us personality is a degradation.

And because the individual man clings to his existence and will not accept its annihilation, they abuse words, and tell him his individuality remains while his personality will perish.

This is surely a great mystery—a mighty dust-cloud of ignorance. A stick, a star, a rocking-horse, has individuality; but personality it has none. Personality adds to individuality the note of a rational, intelligent nature. Stocks and stones and statues are individuals; we are persons. Surely personality is a perfection of individuality; and if the absolute is perfect, it must be personal.

The person is the individual, but it is the

rational individual—the being possessing a rational nature.

And again, human nature in John is the same as human nature in Peter. But human nature itself does not naturally exist at all as human nature, but as individualised in John and in Peter, who are thereby *persons, i.e.*, “individual existing human natures terminated by their own proper personalities.” If they cease to be persons, they cease to be individuals; and thus individuality cannot persist when personality disappears and the soul becomes merged in that ocean, that unconscious, that unknown, and undefined, which is the God of Theosophy.

But Theosophy uses the words individuality and personality after a fashion of its own. What it calls the four perishable constituents of man, viz., his physical body, its physical life, his astral body, and his animal life, constitute the personality; whereas his intellect, his spiritual soul, and his Atma or the divine element within him, constitute the individuality; and it is this individuality which works out its career of transmigration, manifesting itself in a series of forms or personalities, each more or less perfect than the last as the individual progresses towards union with the absolute.

In other words, our human persons are nothing but the ever-changing vesture or mask, under which, in the course of its reincarnations, the individual makes its bow to the world before being finally absorbed in the Great Reality from which it emanated. They are like the rainbow which the raindrop makes known to us, which appears for a time and then returns to the general bosom of the radiance of the sky; or like the sun which goes from the bubbles when they burst.

In its ultimate analysis, the whole theory is a most pantheistic one. "The craving for the continuity of personal existence," we are told by one of the Theosophic adepts, "is manifestly no more than a weakness of the flesh."

The Deity, the Supreme Power, sleeps in the cold stone: wake it up, and, as it evolves itself, unchanged in its own essence, but manifesting itself more and more as its vehicle becomes more perfect, you will observe the stone become the plant, the plant the animal, the animal the man, the man the angel or spirit, till at last the choice is made of entering Nirwana, or making the great renunciation by remaining on the Devachan Plain and working for the regeneration of the human race as long as one member of it

remains too imperfect to be absorbed again into the invisible principle.

The great souls who have reached this stage of progress receive the name of mahatmas, and proclaim themselves gifted with powers over the universe which produce what ordinary mortals call *miracles*. In proof of their own existence, and of the powers they possess, the marvels certainly are produced; and no theory of imposture or cunning can explain all of them.

I am not unmindful that we have the wonders of the telegraph and telephone and Marconi's great secret, to warn us that it is unsafe to lay narrow bounds to the powers which God and nature have put into our hands.

Yet I think there remains of the marvels of Theosophy a substantial residuum, which admits of only one explanation: namely, that behind the scene there is an intelligent power in the presence of which man's intelligence is dwarfed: call it mahatma if you will.

Curiously, there is a strange similarity between the wonders of Theosophy and those of Spiritism; but these latter ascribe their phenomena to the spirits of the departed, while the Theosophists claim them to be the

acts of the mahatmas or perfected ones on the brink of Nirwana.

In either case, on the authority of their own teaching, they are invisible agents—and Christianity has a name for them with which philosophy has nothing to do.

The angelic world of good or evil spirits more gifted in intellect and power than man, belongs to *Revelation* rather than to *human knowledge*. Nevertheless, reason is capable of pronouncing, and does pronounce, that such Revelation is altogether in harmony with established facts; and “it is quite a plausible theory that some fallen angel thirsting for divine honours,” or eager to mislead man’s groping after Truth, “has always been ready to hide behind some fair or grotesque mask,” and receive the homage of and sometimes respond to the demands of the deluded questioner.

But, at least, man’s craving for liberty is flattered; he is freed from all responsibility—from the inconvenient encumbrance of a personal God: while the most terrible penalty threatened on the *evil-doer* is that he will reincarnate on a lower level, and will perhaps in the end disappear altogether.

Such is the latest answer to our desire for immortality.

Our latter-day science, says a French writer, is laborious, skilful, mighty, but blind: yes, blind. It has been robbed of its sight—Theology; and while I shall endeavour to keep clear of all purely theological argument, I shall now attempt that most difficult of tasks—a synopsis of St Thomas's adaptation of Aristotle's teaching on the soul, corrected by the light of Christianity.

Blind
Science

The observation of the change upon change of the phenomena of nature, gives rise straightway in the thinking and observant mind to the question whether this has gone on in an infinite series, reaching back to eternity.

The earth, in the Indian story, rested on an elephant; the elephant on a tortoise; and the tortoise . . . what was its support? Such a view of the universe is like that of an arch resting on one pillar, like a bridge ending in an abyss. "No lengthening of a suspension bridge to Infinity," writes Father Rickaby, "will dispense with the need of supports not themselves suspended." And therefore the origin of all change must be sought in a being unchanged and incapable of change.

And since we find the changes wrought in

the material world evolve themselves according to intelligence, order, and law,
 God we must attribute intelligence to that immutable Being, the Origin of all that exists.

God is law, say the wise ; O Soul ! let us rejoice,
 For if He thunder by law . . . the thunder is still
 His voice.

But modern science is blind, and cannot find God.

The pagan Aristotle looked around the world and saw its phenomena, its order, its harmony ; and he considered the speculations of many minds before he wrote these words :—
 “ It is unreasonable to instance fire, or earth, or anything of that nature, as the cause of Goodness and Beauty in things. Nor were it well to assign the work of such production to spontaneity or chance ; but whoever said that Intelligence is the cause of all order and systematic arrangement, as in animals, so also in insensible nature, the author of that remark appeared as a man in his sober senses coming in upon a company of random talkers.” That intelligent cause of order is God.

Now Aristotle, like all physical philosophers, was met at the outset of his study of nature

with the difficulty of reconciling the ceaseless change of the material world with that fundamental unity and permanence which he discerned in it. And thinking over this, he was led to the conclusion that there must be in all material things two principles—or a twofold principle: a passive, undetermined substratum and an active, determining cause of the change. These two he called First Matter and First Form, which are not distinguishable by any physical analysis, but by that necessity of our minds which refers diverse phenomena to different sources.

This being true of all material bodies, when we come to animal bodies we find a still more urgent need for some co-ordinating and maintaining principle. This principle is again supplied in the First Form, which now takes the name of psyche or anima, and which we may loosely translate as vital force or principle. It also follows that in every living thing there can be but one vital principle, and that all the operations of the animal depend on it.

If we observe that the operations of the vital principle are conterminous with the animated organism of which it is the form, we may safely conclude that once the separation between the passive and the active constituents is made

there will be cessation of the previously existing individual.

But if we find the vital principle enjoying operations not dependent intrinsically on the matter of which it is the form, we must conclude that such vital principle has in itself an existence not altogether dependent on its union with the matter which it now informs or actuates. And the reason is, that the operation cannot be more perfect than the principle from which it emanates.

Now, the manifestation of life in the vegetable kingdom consists solely in growth, and, in the animal kingdom, in growth and in sensation. Hence, we conclude that the vital principle in the one is merely vegetative, and in the other vegetative and sensitive in one; and, since these activities depend absolutely on matter and are involved in it, we conclude that a principle so manifesting itself is conterminous with its First Matter, and disappears at the death of its unit.

Whereas, in studying the human individual, we find not only growth and sensation, but such activities as understanding and willing, which are not the activities of any bodily organism; and we conclude that the vital principle having these activities is certainly super-organic—is not

Nature of
the Human
Soul

bounded by the body which it animates and of which it is the First Form. It is therefore a substance and can exist by itself, though it has an intrinsic inclination to exist in a body and an extrinsic dependence on that body for its activities. No doubt, we observe wisdom and intelligence in the animal kingdom ; but it is a passive wisdom, determined to a certain circumscribed sphere of action—an intelligence not of the animal but of its creator ; and because the animal intelligence is passive, it has no language. We do not think because we speak. We speak because we think.

Again, we notice that the activities of growth and of sensation in men in no way differ from similar activities in the animal kingdom, and depend for their manifestation on an organism ; whereas the other activity of knowing or understanding is not organic—*e.g.*, I put my hand in the fire. Now, the sensation of burning is not the same as the idea. Then, too, I have ideas of immaterial things, such as God ; of abstractions, such as Being, Cause, Freedom ; and even ideas representing matter in an immaterial way, such as Humanity, or Triangle in general, which can by no means be pictured to my imagination. All of which ideas force us to the conclusion that the being from whom these operations come must be im-

material. I can picture or image to myself what a tree is—but not what Truth is, or Humanity. And not only do I know these things, but I know that I know them: I can reflect on my knowledge of them. “Thus I find that I can not only think and reason about some event . . . but I, the being who thinks, can reflect on this thinking . . . and I can apprehend myself as reflecting, and know myself as reflecting, to be absolutely identical with the being who thinks and reasons about the given event.

“But evidently such an operation cannot be effected by a faculty exerted by a material organ.

“One part of matter may act on another: it may attract or repel it. It may be doubled back upon it, but the same atom can never act upon or reflect upon itself.

“The action of a material atom must always have for its object something other than itself.

“This individual unity of consciousness, which I have in knowing myself, is possible only to a spiritual agent . . . a faculty that does not operate by means of a material organ.”¹

Hence the vital principle in man is a spiritual, immaterial substance which is united to the body as its First Form and contributes

¹ *Psychology*, Rev. M. Maher, S.J., p. 246.

to it vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life.

Introspection assures us that it is the same being who thinks and feels; and that the vegetative principle is identical with the rational principle is evident, if we call to mind how the atmosphere, the use of narcotics, the action of the stomach or of the liver, may modify the colour of our mental life.

But where does it come from? How is it called into being? It is a spiritual substance, but finite of capacity, and therefore cannot have existed always. On the other hand, seeing that it is independent of matter, it cannot be produced by any material cause. We are obliged to confess that it comes from God, who made it out of nothing.

Origin of
Human
Souls

As to how this spiritual principle acts through its material coefficient and is reacted upon by it, we are not able to say. "The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable," says Mr Tyndall. He means, of course, that we cannot explain it in any physical way: and this is a repetition of our argument for the existence of the immaterial soul.

But the generally accepted view of modern

physiology, with regard to the vital force in any living thing, is that it is not a force which does WORK, but one which directs the other natural forces how to apply their energies. The labourers are the physical forces, the overseer the vital force, which in the animal kingdom acts by an instinct implanted by the great intelligent cause of all things.¹

We can apply the same saying to man; and our view is that the spiritual principle in man directs the natural forces by means of the brain. Hence the creation of the human soul does not add to the physical forces of the universe, but merely to their government.

It is altogether in accord with the Physiological Psychology of St Thomas to describe the living human body as a complicated system of electric wires communicating with this intellectual principle. The sensations we receive by taste, hearing, touch, etc., travel along these wires to a common repository—the brain. Omitting various recent attempts at cerebral localisation, we can further admit that every sensation

¹ "Whither, midst falling dew,
Dost thou pursue
Thy solitary way?
There is a Power, whose care
Teaches thy way along the pathless coast."

W. C. BRYANT: *To a Sea-Fowl.*

(conscious or not) which we receive makes some physical change in the nerve-centres of the brain and registers, so to speak, a memorandum of what has occurred in the cells of the brain. Further, it is the opinion of many physiologists, that the convolution of the front of the cerebrum contains higher nerve-centres in communication with the whole brain; but what is most peculiar about them is that they are inhibitory :¹—that is, they act like an electric switch controlling a certain number of lights, which they turn on or off. It would not be a wild stretch of fancy to hold that it is by means of these centres that the process of immaterialising the bodily sensations before presenting them to the intelligent soul takes place. This does not make the brain the cause of knowledge, but the condition of it : just as light is a condition of seeing, but not the cause of it.

Suppose I wish to think deeply or seriously :—naturally, I do not want to have my thoughts disturbed ; and by an act of will these higher nerve-centres are set to work, and control or shut off the lower ganglia, thus leaving the mind in peaceful communication with such cells as have a bearing on the matter it deliberates. I say by an *act of the will* : for

¹ Cf. an interesting article on the "Nerves and the Brain," in the *Dublin Review*, by Dr Gasquet, April 1880.

since the highest cerebral centres are inhibitory, we are bound to assume something beyond the nervous system causing that inhibition.

I would suggest that we can continue this line of explanation further and say that, since

<p>The Brain the Organ of Sensa- tions</p>	<p>the brain is the organ of all our sensations and the condition of all our direct knowledge of the world without us, and since all cerebral activity is controlled by these higher nerve-centres—if we suppose that either by an act of the will or by sheer weariness the activity or harmony of the higher nerve-centres is exhausted or relaxed, the intelligent and sentient soul loses touch more or less with the lower nerve-centres and cells, the line of communication between the faculties of the soul and the outer world is broken, and the phenomenon we call sleep ensues. This seems to me a possible theory as to the hypnotic state and to the phenomenon of dreams.</p>
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Moreover, bearing in mind what I have said as to all our sensations (conscious or not) leaving a memorandum of their existence in one of the cells of the brain, it is not difficult to account for the so-called reminiscences of a former life,—those long-lost recollections which give some plausibility to the Transmigration theory.

The mention of Transmigration warns me that I have been digressing. Well then, I have endeavoured to show that there exists in every man a vital principle which is spiritual, immaterial, and substantial or subsistent, created by God, who endowed it with vegetative, sentient, and intelligent faculties or capabilities, for the exercise of which it must be united to a material body.

The Impossibility of Transmigration

But because this vital principle, which we call the soul, is spiritual and super-organic, it is, by its very nature, incorruptible: that is, there are no elements or constituents into which it can be resolved. The very simplicity of the human soul is its passport for immortality. He alone who called it into being can destroy it, and to suppose that God, who has given man a desire, a longing for eternal life, will annihilate him, is to accuse God's wisdom of foolishness, God's justice of robbery. "Everything we know of man demands immortality, everything we know of God assures us that that demand is not futile, and will have its fulfilment."¹

"It must be so—

Else whence this pleasing hope, this fond desire,
This longing after immortality?

¹ Driscoll : *Philosophy of the Soul*, p. 244.

Why shrinks the soul
Back on herself, and startles at destruction?
'Tis heaven itself that points out a hereafter,
And intimates Eternity to man.
The soul, secured in her existence, smiles
At the drawn dagger, and defies its point.
The stars shall fade away, the sun himself
Grow dim with age, and Nature sink in years ;
But thou shalt flourish in immortal youth,
Unhurt amidst the war of elements."

Thus wrote Joseph Addison two hundred years ago, and the American Cardinal, in words I have already quoted, bears the same testimony.

Whence this universal belief in man's immortality? "Not from prejudice arising from education ; and we must conclude that a sentiment so general, so deep-rooted, must have been planted in the human heart by Almighty God, even as He implanted in us an instinctive love of truth and justice."

But even this immortal soul is not the whole man. It needs body and soul in union to constitute the perfect human being. The soul without the body is an impaired, an incomplete man. Death of the body was never part of God's original plan ; and it is a punishment for the individual. A craving for completeness must always remain in the separated soul, and this can only be satisfied by the resurrection of the body. "Then shall be brought to pass

the saying that is written : ' Death is swallowed up in victory. ' ”

Till then, the separated soul lives on with all its faculties indeed, but separated from its body. The vegetative and sensitive faculties are inactive for want of an organism through which to act ; and the intellect is cut off from all contact with this world.

As long as it was united to its body, it could go on adding to its store of knowledge, grasping general principles and ideas, and affirming the existence of the phenomena of its sensations, by means of the sensible images presented to it by the brain. But now that bridge of communication has been withdrawn and sensible images are an impossibility. Since the soul lives in a purely spiritual world, it can no longer of its own *natural power* perceive the vicissitudes of earth. It can reflect on the knowledge it acquired during its union with the body—not by turning to sensible images, but in some spiritual way ; and it may also know the spirit-forms around it—for as the spirit-world into which it has passed is altogether different from our material world, so also will the soul's mode of knowledge be.¹

I speak merely of its natural knowledge :

¹ Cf. Lepicier's *Unseen World*.

not of any supernatural knowledge which comes from the vision of God, nor of any infused knowledge with which God's generosity will reward the just, but of the knowledge which is the soul's right and due in its new state.

And I refer to this, because it follows that if the soul is thus by its own nature cut off from direct knowledge of this world, it must necessarily be cut off from all power of directly affecting material things; and hence the teaching about mahatmas and departed great souls is the great illusion, the great dust-cloud raised up to hide the real actors in the drama of Theosophy.

Such is a brief summary of one field of human philosophy sketched out roughly by the pagan Aristotle, whom St Thomas Aquinas reverently calls "The Philosopher," and mapped out with greater fulness and precision by his greater disciple, who lived in more favourable times, when the trembling light of human reason had been steadied and strengthened by the transforming power of the Christian revelation.

I know not how I can better knit together the necessarily "disjointed members" of this lecture than by giving you, as

St Augustine
of Hippo briefly as I can, a portrait of one who sounded all the "depths and shoals" of human thought and passion in his

day—a day far removed from, but not unlike our own—a philosopher and a mystic, who longed for union with the Absolute, who taught the renunciation of self, and found in Christianity the peace that passeth understanding:—I mean St Augustine. And in doing so, I merely compress into a few pages the admirable treatment this subject has received from Mr W. S. Lilly in his essay on “The Christian Revolution.”

Augustine was born in 354, the son of a burgess of Tagaste, of narrow fortune. He was a young man of restless intellect and strong desires, vehement in worldly pursuits and animal impulses.

It was an age of political dissolution, and of intellectual and moral dissolution too. The old popular creeds had long been discredited, and the air resounded with the din of systems in which every variety of opinion known to our times seems to have been more or less closely anticipated.

He tells us that no less than 288 doctrines prevailed as to the primary question of the true end of human action.

Fatalism was at the bottom of all their metaphysical ideas and the last word of their arguments. And the capital fact which marks off that antique civilisation from our own was

that it had no conception of the value of human life, no idea of the dignity of the human personality.

Early in his life, his keen and restless intellect asked the question: "What is the end of life?" In a book of Cicero's, now lost, he found the answer which kindled his soul to a desire for Truth. He sought it on all sides, among the Manichees and the philosophies of paganism; and he thought he had found it in the Neo-Platonists' vision of the absolute and the eternal, and in union with it; for he learned from Plotinus that the rational soul has above it no nature save that of God. But this God was an *anima mundi*, a mere soul of nature, and the way to union with it was "as vague as all unsweet."

But ascending, as he tells us, from corporeal forms to the sentient soul, and thence to its inner faculty to which the bodily senses make their reports, and thence again to the reasoning power which passes judgement on the things thus signified to it, and from thence to the intellectual brightness by which the mind is illuminated to discern truly, he attained to that which is the unchanging, the self-existing, the absolute, and the eternal. But how to get to it, how to be united to it, he found not.

“I was drawn up to Thee by Thy beauty,” he writes, “and presently I was dragged down by the weight of my burden, and this burden was fleshly habit”—that love of the world and the things of the world which is incompatible with the love of God. He turned to St Paul’s Epistles, and he read there of the law of sin reigning in his members and warring against the law of his mind and leading him captive, and he was afraid. “I had found the pearl of great price,” he writes, “and what I had to do was to sell all that I had and buy it; and I hesitated. Those ancient mistresses of mine, trifles of trifles, vanities of vanities, as they were, kept me back, plucked me by the garment of the flesh, and murmured in my ear: ‘Are you in very truth going to send us away? And from this moment will you not see us again for ever, and will you never again do this and that?’ And what a ‘this and that’ was it which they suggested to me? What vileness, what disgrace.”

So taking up the book of St Paul’s Epistles, he opened and read the words on which his eyes first fell: “Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and impurities, not in contention and envying, but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh in its concupiscences.”

Henceforth his rule of action was not his former perverse will, but the good and acceptable and perfect will. He bowed his head to the yoke of Christ, who said, "Let a man deny himself."

"Love took up the harp of life, and smote on all the chords with might,
Smote the chord of self, that, trembling, passed in music out of sight."

"Many," he says, "who knew me in my former days, or knew me not, or have heard from me, or of me, would fain know what manner of man I am now—what my inner self is? To such will I unfold myself, as far as I may."

One thing he knows, and that is that he loves God. But what is it he loves when he loves God, and where does he find Him?

The whole universe of order and beauty proclaims the supreme intelligence that created it, reveals Him while it veils Him, confesses "I am not He, but He made me." Nothing material can be He. And so Augustine turns to his own mind, and considers its faculties and powers, and explores the plains and spacious halls of memory, but finds Him not among the images of corporeal things there, not among the affections of the mind, not in the very seat of the mind itself. And he goes on: "I did seek Thee, rushing

greedily in my deformity after those fair forms Thou hast made. Thou wast with me when I was far from Thee, and those things which exist but because Thou art in them, they held me back from Thee."

And thus he is sure of that daily conflict which is waged in him between the higher law and the other law which is in his members; many and great are the sicknesses of his soul, but he has found the remedy—"If any man will come after Me, let him deny himself."

This is that aboriginal law of self-sacrifice which links the Supreme to His creatures: a law of which the practical outcome is *duty* founded on love for God—"Not my will, but Thine be done," and founded on the vanity of what is given up—"What shall a man take in exchange for his soul?" It was the lower self, "the ape and tiger," which was abolished, mortified, or, in St Paul's phrase, "Kept under and brought into subjection."

The parallel between this teaching and Buddha's is singularly close; but the one ends in nothingness, the other in union with the supreme good, the great personal God, the eternal law-giver, who wills to be freely obeyed, and whom our maimed and wounded human nature obeys with difficulty.

Recall with me that wonderful scene in

The Confessions (Bk. ix., ch. 10), where Augustine and his dying mother meditate on the joys of a life to come. "And we said one to another: 'If any soul were to be still and in perfect silence from all tumult and all noise of the flesh, and from all impressions or images of earth, water, or air; and if the soul were silent to herself, and should pass beyond herself by having no thought of herself; and if every tongue, and every sign, and whatever hath its being by passing away, were also silent . . . because if anyone will hearken to them, they all say, 'We did not make ourselves, but He made us who remaineth for ever':—If, I say, having said this they should all be silent, having directed our ears to Him who made them . . . and so He should speak alone—not by them but by Himself—that we might hear His word—and *if such a thing* were to be continued to us, and all other sights and sounds were to be withdrawn . . . and this one were totally to ravish and swallow up and engulf the beholder into its interior joys, so that our life *for ever* should be as that moment of intelligence was for which we had sighed—would not this be what is written: 'Enter into the joy of thy Lord?' And when shall this be? Shall it be when we shall all rise again—but shall not all be changed?'"

APPENDIX

Works which may be consulted in connection with the foregoing Lecture :—

St Thomas Aquinas—*Summa Theologica* and *Summa contra Gentiles*. (Father Rickaby's Translation.)

L. Janssens, O.S.B—*De Deo Homine*.

V. Remer, S.J.—*Prælectiones Philosophicæ*.

M. Maher, S.J.—*Psychology*.

Wassman—*Instinct and Intelligence in the Animal Kingdom*.

Lilly—*The Great Enigma*.

Ancient Religion and Modern Thought.

G. Fell, S.J.—*The Immortality of the Human Soul*.

Alger—*Doctrine of a Future Life*.

Lepicier—*The Unseen World*.

Monier-Williams—*Buddhism and Brahminism*.

Max Müller—*Chips from a German Workshop* (passim).

Dering—*Esoteric Buddhism*.

Fr. Clarke, S.J.—*Theosophy*.

Charcot—*Diseases of the Nervous System*, Vol. III.

Hollander—*The Mental Functions of the Brain*.

Westminster Lectures (First Series)—

Aveling—*The Immortality of the Soul*.

Moyes—*The Existence of God*.

The Dublin Review (April 1880 and 1882), "The Nerves and the Brain," by Dr Gasquet.

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